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 Abstract 
Sovereign credit ratings provide a summary of the economic conditions of a particular 
country, and are a representation of the ability and willingness of a country to make its 
debt payments as they fall due. These ratings provide an indication of the cost of 
borrowing in that country, so a country would like to obtain the highest possible credit 
rating. These ratings are provided by independent agencies who use their own systems to 
provide a rating and an outlook. Credit ratings are important as they provide information to 
investors on the potential investability and access to financial markets of that particular 
country. The problem found by some literature is the reliability of ratings in emerging 
markets as investors perceive these markets to be riskier in nature. 
In this paper, the aim was to identify what the different factors that the two big agencies, 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s use when rating a country. This is done through using a 
multiple regression model on 5 emerging economies from different continents from 1994 to 
2015, based on annual data. The first step was to find out what are the macro-economic 
variables that have strong correlations with the agencies, and the results show that 
external balances as a % of GDP and the GDP growth have low correlations with the 
ratings. The regression analysis also shows that Moody’s takes the inflation rate into 
consideration when rating a country but Standard and Poor’s does not.  
The paper also wanted to identify the effects of ratings on markets, and this was done 
through the effect of ratings on the interest rate spreads. The results show that the rating 
differential, which was the ratings from Moody’s subtracted from the ratings of Standard 
and Poor’s, affect the interest rate spreads negatively, therefore a better rating should 
reduce the spread and have a positive effect on the financial markets.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and background 
1.1 Introduction 
A Credit Rating Agency (CRA), is an institution that designates ratings to a country and its 
ability to pay its debts.  
Credit rating agencies have played a significant role in supplying information with respect 
to debt instruments and their creditworthiness. They are organisations that monitor 
whether a company or government is able to meet its/ their debts as they fall due. Their 
role is not only to assess and monitor but also to provide information to investors and other 
companies (Ryan, 2012).  
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, a lot of focus and importance has been placed on 
the relevance of credit ratings (Ghosh, 2013).  
 This study focuses on a selected countries that fall into the emerging markets category, 
and aims to identify whether receiving a rating from a CRA will yield the same result in the 
market as receiving a similar rating from another agency. To that extent, this study aims to 
analyse and evaluate how different financial markets in the different economies respond to 
the different ratings that they are given by the agencies. This is done through comparing 
the different ratings that are assigned by the two large agencies, Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s and to examine whether the differences are significant in emerging economies. 
1.2 Background and Context 
According to Smith and Fryer (2012), credit rating agencies are organisations that make 
use of different statistical tools to attach ratings to companies, governments and debt 
instruments such as bonds, based on the chances of a default or non- repayment on 
certain obligations. Rating agencies can be seen as providers of information and this 
information is used by different lenders and users in the market place.  
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A Credit Rating Agency can be seen as undertaking a lot of functions but the main two 
purposes of their activities are: 
i. To act as oversight by serving as a regulatory tool in the financial markets 
ii. To provide support to investors in their market transactions by acting as an 
information centre (Weber & Baumann, 2012). 
The above notion is supported by Kraussl (2003), who suggested that these agencies play 
a key role in the financial decisions taken by market participants with information about 
credit risk that is associated with the various investment decisions made. 
Credit ratings are very meaningful and the agencies are greatly esteemed. These 
agencies play a huge role in the market and also on total market capitalisation. The 
agencies rate the quality of debt and companies. Not only do rating agencies make use of 
a government’s financial statements in order to come up with a rating, but they also make 
extensive use of the level of management quality, the market value of the firm in order to 
produce some of the ratings listed in the above tables. The information that is used is both 
available publicly and also confidentially (Matthies, 2013). 
Any rating agency that is below the investment grade is judged as being speculative or 
“junk”. A “junk” bond is one where the chance of default is high as compared to an 
investment grade bond (Hill, 2007). 
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         Table 1: Sovereign credit ratings 
Number Standard and Poor’s rating Moody’s rating 
1 AAA Aaa 
2 AA+ Aa1 
3 AA Aa2 
4 AA- Aa3 
5 A+ A1 
6 A A2 
7 A- A3 
8 BBB+ Baa1 
9 BBB Baa2 
10 BBB- Baa3 
11 BB+ Ba1 
12 BB Ba2 
13 BB- Ba3 
14 B+ B1 
15 B B2 
16 B- B3 
Source: Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
 
Table 1 above shows an extract of the sovereign ratings that are issued by the two 
agencies. As can be seen, Standard and Poor’s uses positive and negative signs after 
their letters, whereas Moody’s uses numbers from 1 to 3 after their letters. 
Just having ratings is not enough. These ratings have been supported by both rating 
outlooks and credit watches, which provide an insight on what factors might lead to a 
rating change in the future (Kraussl, 2003). 
 
          Table 2: Sovereign Credit Ratings for countries 
Country  Standard and 
Poor’s rating  
Outlook Moody’s rating Outlook 
Argentina B- Stable B3 Stable 
Brazil BB Negative Ba2 Negative 
China AA- Negative Aa3 Negative 
Egypt B- Negative B3 Stable 
Greece B- Stable Caa3 Stable 
Mexico BBB+ Stable A3 Negative 
South Africa BBB Negative Baa2 Negative 
India BB+ Positive Baa3 Stable  
Indonesia BBB- Stable Baa3 Positive 
Source: Author with information from Trading Economics 
Table 2 above, is an extract of some of the emerging economies and shows the different 
ratings attached by the different agencies. These different ratings given per country is what 
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will be analysed to see whether markets are affected differently by the different outlooks 
given. 
Rating agencies can either downgrade a country in times of difficulty or they can upgrade 
in the good times. A change in either direction can communicate new information about a 
particular country, which is usually stronger in emerging markets where there are 
challenges of clarity. An upgrade or a downgrade will usually have spill over effects in 
countries that have similar economies (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). 
The effects of an upgrade (downgrade) on the sovereign debt above or (below) the 
investment grade will have a strong shock on the price levels as these different ratings will 
have an impact on investors all over (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). 
Governments try and get the best ratings possible so as to boost their access to 
international capital markets. These ratings are crucial as they play a key role in 
calculating or determining the cost of borrowing to that particular country (Iyengar, 2012). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The 2008 global financial crisis affected even the most developed nations such as the 
United States, which received a downgrade of its sovereign credit rating. Rating agencies 
have continued to grow in importance since then and the two biggest agencies now act as 
oversight for various governments, therefore they hold the “power” in terms of either 
upgrading or downgrading an economy.   
Moody’s investor services and Standard and Poor’s have been recognised by both market 
participants such as investors and policymakers as having a strong influence and impact 
on the cost of funding and the willingness of institutional investors to hold certain types of 
financial instruments including bonds (Kraussl, 2003). 
Each rating agency uses or attaches its own weights when it comes to assessing a 
country’s economy and the chances that a nation could default on an obligation. Cantor 
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and Packer (1996) identified some factors that contribute to the willingness and ability to 
service a debt and these include Gross Domestic Product, the rate of inflation, balance of 
payments, the economic development, per capita income and the total external debt. Each 
agency may also use other factors when it comes to attaching a rating to a nation, for 
example the exchange rate may be applied by one agency and left out by another agency. 
Each agency uses a different notion when it comes to attaching a rating to a country, and 
these notions therefore indicate a different rating for a country. 
Rating agencies are known to affect the markets after upgrades and downgrades. These 
rating agencies play a key role in both access to international capital markets and also in 
attaching ratings to companies, governments and debt instruments such as bonds. The 
use of different ratings agencies often results in a different response by the markets and 
the relevant stakeholders involved. 
The two big agencies will each apply a different weighting to these factors in order to come 
up with a rating of countries. Developed and developing economies always seek to obtain 
a positive rating from these agencies. A problem exists as to whether there is a superior 
agency and whether Moody’s is better at rating than Standard and Poor’s or vice versa. 
This study aims to understand why these differences exist and why markets respond 
differently to them. The problem that arises when these rating agencies provide different 
ratings, is that the market and therefore the countries involved are therefore provided with 
different results which therefore gives conflicting results which can create confusion at 
times in the market. 
 1.4 Research questions  
The research aims to answer the following questions: 
1) What are the most important factors considered by the two agencies when it comes 
to attaching ratings and is there a rating differential? 
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2) Do these rating agencies follow the same trend when rating countries or firms? 
3) Does the rating differential negatively or positively affect interest rate spreads? 
1.5 Significance of the study   
The study aims to explain why different rating agencies have different ratings for the same 
country, and what are the consequences of these different ratings are to the countries. The 
study also seeks to examine what factors are considered by the different rating agencies 
when it comes to attaching different ratings to a country, which therefore can create 
confusion for the users of this information. 
1.6 Outline of the study 
The research will be conducted and presented in the following manner:- 
The first section will introduce the research topic which will include a brief background on 
credit rating agencies. The second section will be a detailed literature review which will 
begin with an introduction or background of credit rating agencies and will also focus on 
the emerging markets and their response to these ratings. The third section will capture 
the research methodology and will also include an analysis of the data and information of 
the study. Section four of the paper will be a presentation of the findings and an 
interpretation of the results. The last section will include a conclusion on the findings from 
the empirical analysis and will also offer recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
    
2.1 Brief history of rating agencies 
In the early 1900’s, there was a need for industries to raise more capital than they actually 
had, therefore rating agencies acted in an intermediary role by helping investors and 
businesses to come together and do a cost-benefit analysis of a particular venture (Hill, 
2007). The name Moody’s comes from a man called John Moody. His company was the 
first to publish bond ratings in 1909. At this time the company solely focused on railroad 
bonds (White, 2010). Poor’s Publishing Company then followed soon after, by providing 
published ratings in 1916, and then Standard Statistics Company in 1922. Fitch then 
followed in 1924. They all had a similar model whereby the investor paid for the services to 
be rendered (Hill, 2007). 
At first, bond ratings were sold to investors in manuals, as this was before the 
establishment of the U.S Securities and Exchange (White, 2010). 
In 1941, Poor’s and Standard combined to form one company called Standard and Poor’s. 
In the year 2000, the market for other securities began to grow and issuers of these 
instruments had only these three companies to obtain their credit ratings. A favourable or a 
positive rating from these agencies was important as this was helpful in the facilitation of 
the sale of securities and other forms of debt (White, 2010). 
To date, more than 100 countries are being rated in terms of their debt obligations and 
how well they service their debt, by these agencies. 
2.2 Role and function of Rating Agencies  
A variety of economic literature has been centred around the credit rating agencies and 
their effect on emerging markets. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), reiterated that that 
these agencies have a tendency to assign different ratings to the different type of financial 
instruments such as bonds and to the different borrowers which include governments and 
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firms. Agencies do not only provide ratings based on the scales which are summarised in 
the tables above, but also include an outlook which shows where a country or a firm is 
going and whether there is a possibility of a rating upgrade or downgrade in the future. 
These agencies provide either quantitative and qualitative information with regards to the 
creditworthiness of a sovereign or a company when it comes to their debt obligations. Due 
to a highly integrated and globalized world both in terms of physical and financial products, 
the use of credit ratings has increased, therefore placing more importance on rating 
agencies (Frost, 2007).  
According to Smith and Fryer (2012), the use of credit ratings has been increasing 
especially since they play a key role in financial regulations and have also added value in 
emerging markets in order to provide guidance for their growth. Kraussl (2003), supports 
this as sovereign credit ratings have assisted a lot of governments in obtaining access to 
the international bond markets, which stresses their importance and the role these 
agencies play in financial markets. Macey (2006) and Fitzpatrick and Sagers (2009), both 
seem to downplay this by suggesting that there is little evidence that supports the need or 
use of rating agencies, and that they do not supply markets with any extra or useful 
information. The continued rise of rating agencies and overall credit/debt ratings in the 
world is contradiction to the idea that agencies are basically an unnecessary entity in the 
market place (Macey, 2006). A positive that can be drawn from these rating agencies is 
that they are sometimes viewed as being problem-solvers when it comes to the 
information asymmetry that exists between debt issuers/lenders and borrowers (Listokin & 
Taibleson, 2010). Akerlof (1970), suggested that this is done through the rating agencies 
acting as information intermediaries that are constantly providing information on the 
debtor’s level of credit worthiness, which is the rating.  
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Rating agencies have not really had a lot of support from other writers, as they have been 
described as being the ones that are the causes of financial chaos. Ferri et al. (1999), 
claimed that rating agencies have a tendency to follow the economic life cycle, and will 
downgrade an economy in the bad times, but will upgrade one when there are positive 
prevailing financial conditions. 
Kraussl (2003), also affirms the above notion and that credit ratings are a reflection of 
financial market outcomes and rather than the ratings themselves being the cause, 
therefore the issue of credit rating agencies having such power is also questioned. 
Because ratings are a reflection of publicly available information, the outlook and the 
watchlist signals can be seen as the source of private information by rating agencies 
(Alsakka & Gwilym, 2012). 
These rating agencies not only provide ratings to countries and companies, but they also 
extend their services to providing information about the outlooks in the future and the 
rating watch lists (Bannier & Hirsch, 2010). Keenan et al., (1998), defines a rating outlook 
as how the rating will change in the future and is primarily a value judgement provided by 
the agency, whereas a rating watch list are usually of more concern as they are short term 
in nature, and are not only based on qualitative information, but also on quantitative 
information such as the financial conditions in that particular country. If a rating is placed 
on the watch list or under review, then that particular rating is usually different from the 
rating that is not under review, therefore the watch list is very important for those investors 
who want to see the creditworthiness in the short term. A rating outlook is a value 
judgement which shows the way a rating will be headed in the future and has four 
categories which are: positive, stable, negative and developing (Alsakka & Gwilym, 2012). 
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According to Bannier and Hirsh (2010), a watch list can be viewed as a means by which 
rating agencies can monitor countries and firms continuously and effectively, as investors 
will always require credit risk information. 
Some tests were conducted by Bannier and Hirsh (2010), on the effects of a rating review 
or watch list and their study focused mainly on downgrades. Their tests were done in order 
to see whether markets react differently to a direct downgrade or an imminent rating 
downgrade or rating change. The results showed that for low-quality borrowers, a direct 
downgrade is more important than a review downgrade. For borrowers who have good 
ratings, the watch list or review is only used only when demanded by investors, therefore 
the reaction to a direct downgrade is usually similar to a review downgrade. 
Rating agencies are organisations that are also in competition with each other. An 
advantage of having competition among rating agencies according to Cantor and Packer 
(1994), is that competition leads to the agencies wanting to give the best and most realistic 
rating as opposed to having one dominant player in the industry. A problem of bias among 
agencies may arise as each institution or country will try and get the best possible rating. 
Rating agencies are usually forced into this competition against one another for the right to 
attach ratings that companies and governments may be wishing for. There is therefore an 
incentive for these agencies to give issuers a good rating since these agencies are paid for 
these services (Johansson, 2010). However, Hunt (2009), argues that it is difficult for 
these agencies to provide bias reports as they all want to maintain their reputation in the 
markets. 
Since investors and policymakers are affected by these ratings, Kraussl (2003) suggests 
that agencies such as Moody’s have a great impact on both the ability and willingness to 
hold certain instruments and also on the cost of debt attributed to borrowing. 
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Credit ratings have been shown to have a compelling impact on the yield spread and debt 
instruments. A summary of the chances that a country or company will not pay its debts is 
known as sovereign risk. A country that has “junk” status or any other rating below 
investment grade, is the one that will not be able to borrow from international markets and 
will depend on funding from the government. A lot of low income countries have difficulty in 
accessing funding from these international markets, whereas for emerging economies, the 
access to the international markets is of paramount importance but usually dependant on 
circumstances and usually varies over time (Reinhart, 2002). 
Ratings may include sovereign credit ratings. These are valuations and assessments of 
the possibility that the debtor will default on their obligations as they fall due. All 
governments aim to have positive credit ratings as this makes it easier to access 
international capital markets, as many investors always seek securities that have a good 
rating, or rather rated, than unsecured securities (Cantor & Packer, 1996). Although these 
sovereign ratings are crucial in terms of access to capital markets, they also play a key 
role in the ratings that are designated to borrowers of the same nationality.  
These sovereign credit ratings can be divided into two categories which are economic risk 
and political risk. Economic risk is the risk of whether the government will repay its debt 
obligations as they fall due (Kraussl, 2003). 
The other type of risk that usually affects emerging markets is that of political risk. In 
general, emerging markets usually have more political risk or instability than developed 
economies, which often results in higher levels of sovereign default by these economies 
(Cuadra & Sapriza, 2008). Kraussl (2003) also identifies political risk as the enthusiasm 
that a government has to repay its debts on time. 
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Therefore in conclusion, rating agencies are supposed to improve on market efficiency, 
and this is done through providing ratings that are free from bias, are not opaque and that 
are authentic (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al., 2006). 
2.3 Determinants of Sovereign ratings 
The ability and the willingness to pay back a debt obligation at the right time is assessed 
by interested parties through sovereign credit ratings. These interested parties, both 
governments and other market participants in financial markets such as investors (Afonso 
et al., 2011). It is therefore important that governments and other market participants know 
what the most important factors that agencies put an emphasis on are when giving a rating 
score (Montes et al., 2016). These ratings are not only important in terms of gaining 
access to the capital markets, but they are also important in aiding in the stability, 
efficiency and growth of a country’s local and international markets (Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick et al., 2006).  
Standard and Poor’s (2015) identifies that there are five crucial factors that are the 
foundation when it comes to their sovereign credit risk analysis and these are:  
i. Monetary flexibility 
ii. Debt burden 
iii. Economic growth and structure 
iv. International investment and external liquidity  
v. Institutional and governance effectiveness and security risks 
 
Moody’s can also have the same factors that affect sovereign risk but the weights attached 
to each factor may be very different which will result in a different rating being given to a 
particular country (Cantor and Packer, 1996). 
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These ratings as identified by Afonso et al., (2011) are a very crucial factor in determining 
the interest rates that countries encounter and also on their cost of borrowing. From the 
above definition and implications, it is therefore important for all market participants and 
governments to understand the factors that determine a credit rating that is assigned by 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s or Fitch. So basically, a sovereign rating is a continuous 
evaluation and assessment on the chances that a country will not pay back its debt, in 
other words, the chances of default (Afonso et al., 2011).  
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), gave a simple definition of a rating, by saying that a rating 
is a way of looking into the future and the chance of default. Credit ratings are not only 
assigned to sovereign or governments, but they also assigned to both public and private 
countries within those countries. These ratings do not necessarily have to be the same as 
the sovereign rating, but a sovereign rating is important as it acts as a benchmark for the 
ratings assigned to companies within a particular country (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). 
Ratings are not only influenced by macro-economic factors, but also by the default history 
of the country whereby political factors may be very relevant (Mora, 2006). 
An empirical analysis that was carried out by Afonso et al., (2011), decided to break down 
the determinants of sovereign ratings into short-term and long-term factors. The reason for 
them doing this was that they analysed and saw that countries’ ratings do not change 
much over time. In their analysis, they used linear regression models to determine what 
the cut-off points were in the rating scale. Their results showed that in the short-term, real 
GDP growth, government balances, GDP per capita and the level of public debt are the 
main determinants of sovereign ratings in this time horizon. External debt, external 
reserves and the effectiveness of a government are crucial determinants in the long-run. 
Another test to determine the factors that determine a sovereign rating was done by 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) and focused on the two main rating agencies, Standard 
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and Poor’s and Moody’s. The results from the tests found that qualitative factors are not 
the only important input when it comes to determining a sovereign rating. From the 
economic variables in the tests that were run, only inflation and Gross National Product 
per capita were the most relevant when it comes to determining the ratings, as they are 
forward looking. The level of foreign reserves and current account balance were also 
important factors. Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), also found that qualitative factors such 
as political risk and cultural differences are also important, but the problem is that they are 
not easily quantifiable. A lot of countries face other challenges such as the way to manage 
their debt, suffer from weak banking systems and other inefficiencies that negatively affect 
productivity, when it comes to providing ratings. An additional point is that the way that a 
country is rated depends on its level of development and relative stability.  
There are different views on whether to base sovereign ratings solely quantitative factors 
only or not. According to Afonso (2003), and Cantor and Packer (1996), they are not 
advocates of using qualitative factors such as political factors, because of the difficulty in 
measuring such factors accurately. Other writers such Feder and Uy (1985) and Lee 
(1993), suggest that using or adding political variables into a model added some 
explanatory power, and therefore such factors should definitely be included. 
Credit rating agencies identify four categories that are used to assign ratings and these 
are; economic structure, macro-economic management, external viability and growth 
potential (Bhatia, 2002). When Altenkirch (2005) ran her tests on 26 countries, she found 
that external viability which included current account deficit balances and foreign reserves 
which were used as proxies, were found to be the most crucial area for rating agencies. 
This was particularly true for emerging markets as they are more prone or sensitive to 
external shocks. Current account deficit is important, especially when this deficit is 
persistent over a number of years, then it suggests an increase in the level of debt, and if 
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not corrected, will lead to an unsustainable level in future, therefore negatively affecting a 
rating. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) found that low inflation, high GDP growth, and no credit default 
on foreign currency debt over the last 20 years, high levels of economic development and 
high per capita income, were all indicators in achieving a high rating. This theory was later 
supported by Gultekin-Karakas et al., (2011), who suggested that low ratings are usually 
attributed to low income level countries such as many of the emerging markets. 
According to Afonso (2003), the rating that is attached to a particular country is correlated 
with the level of development in that country. Altenkirch (2005), found that current account 
deficits were important in determining a rating, Afonso (2003) found that current account 
as a percentage of GDP and debt to GDP ratio, were poorly correlated with sovereign 
credit ratings, and therefore they did not yield any significant results. 
The determinants were also separated between developed vs developing economies. 
From the results of the countries analysed, 52 were developing and 29 were developed 
economies. GDP per capita was an important determinant in both developed and 
emerging economies, whereas the external debt was seen to be very important in 
developing economies (Afonso, 2003). Montes et al., (2016), carried out tests on the 
determinants of sovereign ratings in 40 developing countries. He found that if a country 
wants to improve on its sovereign rating, it should focus on the unemployment rate, foreign 
reserves, external debt, budget balance, inflation rate and GDP growth rate. Financial 
openness and inflation targeting were also seen as relevant factors for the developing 
economies. A less corrupt government and a democratic system that has law and order 
are also ways of improving sovereign ratings for emerging economies. 
Rowland (2004) carried out some tests on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings on 
49 developing economies, and identified that the level of international reserves and trade 
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and financial openness are also very important factors in achieving a good or a bad rating. 
Ozturk (2014), supports the inclusion of qualitative factors that earlier writers such as 
Feder and Uy (1985) and Lee (1993) had identified as important, and Ozturk (2014) 
suggests that governance efficiency and effectivenss are important determinants of ratings 
especially in developing nations. For developing economies, the rule of law, a strong 
judicial system and the protection of property rights are also seen as being determinants of 
sovereign ratings (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012). 
Some other indicators that are similar to the ones as above can be external balances 
which is a measure which indicates the current account balance. A current account surplus 
may suggest that the economy does not rely heavily on external funds which may lead to a 
positive outlook for an economy. The other one may be real GDP growth which is basically 
an indication of the growth and increasing growth may indicate that a country may find it 
easy to meet their obligations as they fall due (Iyengar, 2012). 
 
2.4 Impact of Ratings on Exchange rates, stock markets and bond markets 
As pointed out by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), a sovereign rating is important as it 
provides a benchmark for the ratings that are assigned to companies within that particular 
country. Afonso et al., (2011), concurs with this evaluation, as they also point out that 
sovereign ratings definitely have an effect on the credit ratings of companies and banks in 
that country. Since most investors are risk averse, they really pay attention to the credit 
ratings of a particular country and therefore the companies involved, when choosing their 
optimal portfolio. 
2.4.1 Impact of ratings on exchange rates  
Credit rating agencies play a very important function in international financial markets as 
they present rating information through ratings, reviews and outlooks (Alsakka & Gwilym, 
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2012). Because of the way markets are integrated now due to the fact of increased 
globalisation, exchange rates play an important role in terms of financial performance 
(Alsakka & Gwilym, 2012). 
Goldstein et al., (2000), carried out a series of tests to see whether sovereign ratings do 
indeed anticipate foreign currency crises, and their results showed that sovereign ratings 
do not do very well in predicting currency crises and are then adjusted after the fact. 
Alsakka and Gwilym (2012) conducted tests on 124 developed and developing countries 
on the effect of rating changes on exchange rates. They found that ratings and signals of 
ratings tend to significantly impact the home country exchange rates, the reason for this 
being exchange rates usually incorporate new information in a quick and timely manner. If 
market participants view ratings to be country specific, then there will be little spill-over 
effects on other exchange rates as a result (Ferreira & Gama, 2007). Since financial 
markets are more integrated now, spill-over effects of exchange rates should arise. 
In addition, Alsakka and Gwilym (2012) analysed the downgrading of Greece in 2011 from 
A3 to Ba1, and found that the euro ended up depreciating against the dollar. 
2.4.2 Impact of sovereign ratings on stock and debt markets 
Market participants such as investors have different responses to rating announcements. 
The reason for this is that sovereign ratings are usually based on several factors which are 
publicly available. The challenge with this is that rating agencies do not only use publicly 
available information, and hence different responses in the market place (Pukthuanthong-
Le et al., 2007). The accessing of ratings is of particular importance to these investors as 
they are the main market participants, so therefore particular attention is paid to the 
sovereign ratings (Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007). The question here is that are ratings an 
important factor in the stock and equity markets or are they independent of each other? 
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A downgrade of sovereign bonds might have a negative effect on the equity markets. The 
reason for this is that, there will be a higher tax rate that is charged on firms as a result to 
offset the negative impact of the higher interest rates as a result of a downgrade 
(Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002). Additionally Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) carried out 
some tests on emerging markets over ten years and found that a change in a rating is a 
result of a change in the outlook. Therefore what this means is that a new credit rating is 
not really considered as a shock and hence the movements in equity and bond prices do 
not reflect the valuation that is caused by the rating. 
This is in contradiction to what Cantor and Packer (1996) found. They wanted to see if 
announcements of sovereign ratings have an impact on US dollar bond spreads. Their 
results showed that sovereign ratings are strongly linked with changes in bond spreads. 
A number of empirical studies that have been carried out have tried to find out whether 
ratings have a significant influence on markets using vector autoregressive (VAR) 
modelling and Granger-Causality tests. The results from the tests carried out have been 
very contradictory.  
Cantor and Packer (1996), carried out tests on 35 emerging market countries and the 
effects of sovereign credit ratings on government yield spreads, and reached the 
conclusion that upgrades were followed by significant declines in government yield 
spreads, but downgrades did not produce significant effects. The impact of these ratings 
were seen to be stronger for the speculative-grade rather than the investment-grade. 
Reisen and Von Maltzan (1999) came up with different conclusions. They carried out a 
study on 29 countries from 1989 to 1997. What they found was that when there is a 
possibility for a downgrade and the outlook is negative for a country, there was a 
significant effect on the government yield spread. The only consistency between the two 
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different tests carried out was that, the effect on the yield spreads was much stronger for 
those countries which were below the investment-grade.  
Kraussl (2000), examined the connection between credit rating announcements and 
government bond yield spreads using VAR models. He concluded that a sudden change in 
a rating does not automatically have an immediate effect on emerging market bond yield 
spreads. 
Gropp and Richards (2001), are of the view that financial markets are both efficient and 
semi-strong, and therefore the market prices should not be affected by credit ratings. This 
view is also supported by Kraussl (2003), who says that rating agencies such as Moody’s 
only have access to readily available information which can only be accessed publicly. 
When it comes to the impact of ratings on financial markets, there are conflicting views. 
Corporate securities are indeed affected as a result of rating announcements (Hard et al, 
1992), whereas Richards and Deddouche (1999) focused on emerging markets and found 
that bank stock prices are not affected by rating changes. Later, Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) who also focused on emerging markets, found that for those countries being rated, 
equity and bond markets are directly affected as a result of the rating change and outlook. 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al., (2007) carried out tests on 34 countries, both developed and 
emerging markets on the effects of rating changes on equity and debt prices. They found 
that rating agencies, do indeed provide financial markets with new information and 
changes in both the ratings and the outlook do indeed affect equity and bond markets. 
Markets do react to new information, but countries tend to react to this information 
differently. They found that bond markets react positively when the outlook is that of an 
upgrade as a result of an increase in economic growth and a decrease in the chances of 
default. A reduction is default risk or a credit rating upgrade does not really help stocks, 
but definitely has a positive impact on bonds. 
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Brooks et al., (2004) found that a rating downgrade has a positive effect on equity returns 
and they also found that the reaction of rating changes is not equal across the rating 
agencies. Brooks et al., (2004) found that downgrades affect a country’s stock market 
negatively, but the effects of an upgrade are insignificant. 
Equity markets are definitely expected to react to a sovereign credit downgrade because if 
a country is downgraded, it tends to affect the borrowing costs in the international markets 
and this will assist in a credit crunch, which usually tends to harm the stock markets 
(Ferreira & Gama, 2007). 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) took it a step further by trying to identify what are the spill-over 
effects of a rating change to other countries equity returns. They found that rating 
downgrades do tend to affect markets negatively, but upgrades have no real impact. They 
also found that a country’s status as an emerging market is positively correlated with a 
downgrade input. 
Harper et al., (2008), analysed 42 countries in terms of their volatility when ratings change. 
What they found was that upgrades tend to reduce volatility whereas downgrades increase 
the volatility of both stock and bond markets, but usually to varying degrees. According to 
Afonso et al., (2014), who carried out tests on 21 European Union countries, they found 
that in this Euro-area, a downgrade of a particular country leads to an increase in the 
volatility of other countries, whereas an upgrade does not really affect the volatility of 
bonds and equities. 
2.5 Ratings and their effect on capital flows and financial development 
 
Emerging markets have some special features that distinguish them from emerging 
markets. Because of their low and sometimes negative correlation with developed 
economies, and usually offering higher returns, emerging markets offer investors a chance 
to diversify their portfolios (Buckberg, 1995). As a result of market integration and 
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globalisation, which has capital flows, there has been an increase in the demand for 
sovereign ratings by investors, especially since they want to diversify their portfolios 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). Altenkirch (2005) also emphasises the importance of 
credit ratings in an emerging market context as they are important when it comes to capital 
flows which may include foreign portfolio investments for both private and public projects. 
Ratings act as a signal or rather a simple summary of a country’s political, economic and 
financial situation, therefore are important as they attract investments and capital flows 
(Erdem & Varli, 2014). 
Reisen and Von Maltzan (1998) said that capital flows are definitely affected by sovereign 
ratings. During periods of high economic growth and activity, a positive rating and outlook 
increases the expectations of investors, therefore increasing capital flows. In periods of 
recession, when a country is downgraded, it causes panic and unrest amongst investors 
and capital flight is the result. They conducted tests on 26 emerging economies to test for 
market volatility and found that bond and stock market volatility is reduced after positive 
rating announcements, and volatility in the market increases following negative rating 
announcements. 
Kim and Wu (2008) believe that the only way for a country to increase international capital 
inflows and financial sector development is through keeping borrowing costs low, have 
good credit ratings, good rule of law and transparency. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) had 
earlier confirmed this by saying that the major factor that influences developed economies 
to want to invest in emerging markets are the sovereign credit ratings. For financial 
intermediation to take place and the allocation of capital in any market, there has to be 
financial development (Kim and Wu, 2008) which is very important in emerging markets. 
Emphasis is placed on the importance of financial development because this is usually 
expected to increase investments and savings, thereby aiding in economic growth 
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(Adrianaivo & Yartey, 2010). Emerging markets face several challenges such as 
corruption, a lack of transparency and political risk, which usually stunt the level of 
financial intermediation and therefore lack of development (Kim & Wu, 2008). 
Demand in a country can be increased through improved sovereign ratings, which signal 
investor protection, transparency and low country risk, which in turn will foster and 
increase financial development (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
Kim and Wu (2008) carried out tests on 51 emerging markets to analyse how both short 
and long term ratings affect international capital flows and financial development. They 
found that capital inflows such as foreign direct investment increases as a result of an 
improvement in foreign currency long-term ratings of emerging markets. With regards to 
the short-term ratings, they found that both financial market development and capital 
inflows are deterred by improvements in short-term ratings. The reason for this is that, an 
improvement in short-term ratings, causes sovereigns to then neglect long-term financing, 
which lessens the importance of long-term financial markets such as foreign direct 
investment, and increases liquidity risk. Local currency long-term ratings had a negative 
impact on international capital flows but it did lead to the growing importance of 
developments in both the banking sector and stock markets. 
2.6 Stability and reliability of rating agencies 
 
Credit rating agencies exist not only to provide ratings to lenders and borrowers, but also 
reduce or eliminate the information asymmetry that exists between them. Sovereign 
ratings are mainly based on information that is available in the public setting, but rating 
agencies have often been accused of incorporating private information that is given by 
private borrowers and lenders (Reisen & Von Maltzan, 1998). Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s dominate the market share and usually charge governments and corporates to get 
their ratings. Because of this, rating agencies may not want to upset their clients by 
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downgrading them, because doing so would decrease the demand of their services 
(Reisen & Von Maltzan, 1998). 
The importance of rating agencies has increased over the years as a result of market 
integration and globalisation. These agencies have often come under criticism for being 
reactive rather than being proactive when it comes to issuing ratings in the market. Reisen 
and Von Maltzan (1999) suggested that the Mexican disaster of 1994-1995 was not 
anticipated by rating agencies, but rather they reacted to the crisis. 
Rating agencies were also accused of playing a huge role in the subprime mortgage-
backed securities crisis by assigning high ratings in order to increase their overall profits 
(Lugano et al., 2015). The continuous criticisms of rating agencies has led them to aiming 
towards providing correct and accurate information all the time (Reisen & Von Maltzan, 
1999).  
Hill et al., (2010) claimed that rating agencies often disagree on the ratings and their 
quality and say that these differences are usually attributable to the way the ratings are 
used, the current rating and the timing and changing of the rating quality. They conducted 
tests on 129 countries to see whether rating agencies tend to follow each other, and they 
found that rating agencies tend to disagree more often than not on ratings, therefore 
usually have contrasting opinions. 
Devenow and Welch (1996) came up with a term “herding”. What this term means is that, 
because rating agencies tend to rival each other and are concerned with their reputation, 
they can sometimes let the ratings of other agencies influence their own ratings that they 
attach. Mariano (2012), supports the fact that those rating agencies with good reputations 
tend to have an influence on lower reputational agencies, therefore a strong herding 
influence by highly reputable agencies.  
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Guttler and Wahrenburg (2007) said that a way for rating agencies to save on time and 
money is by adjusting a rating once another agency does so. Guttler (2011) carried out 
tests to see the lead-lag relationship between Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s on 
corporates over a 10 year period and found that an upgrade by one agency leads to a 
higher upgrade, usually by one grade by the other agency. The opposite was also true for 
downgrades. 
Alsakka and Gwilym (2010) wanted to study lead-lag relationships on sovereign ratings. 
They used sovereign ratings because of the increase in globalisation in the world. They 
carried out tests on all sovereigns rated by 5 rating agencies: Moody’s, Fitch, Standard 
and Poor’s, Japan Credit Rating agency (JCR) and Rating and Investment Information 
(R&I). The last two are Japanese agencies. The tests were carried out over a 15 year data 
set. They found that Moody’s is usually the first mover in upgrading sovereigns whereas 
Standard and Poor’s leads Moody’s when it comes to downgrading. They also found that 
Standard and Poor’s is the most independent agency when it comes to rating sovereigns. 
Moody’s and the Japanese agencies tend to have more stable ratings, as opposed to 
Standard and Poor’s which has high rating volatility. 
Lugano et al., (2015) conducted tests on the subprime crisis and the way the agencies 
reacted. What they found was that Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s tend to influence 
each other since they hold the majority of the market share, but Fitch does not influence 
any of the two agencies. 
The main objective of rating agencies is to provide accurate and timely information. Market 
participants especially investors, have accused rating agencies of being slow in adjusting 
their ratings and this creates a problem for investors as they do not want to always re-
adjust their portfolios (Altman & Rijken, 2004). Stability in ratings can only be achieved by 
focusing on the long-term and only adjusting ratings when significant events trigger a 
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change (Standard and Poor’s, 2003). Gaillard (2013) said that the level of accuracy of 
sovereign ratings can be measured by calculating how accurate the ratings are in the form 
of a ratio, getting cumulative default rates and analysing the rates before default. Cantor 
(2001) says that rating agencies only take action when it comes to rating, only if the rating 
is unlikely to change over the short-term, therefore achieving stability.  
2.7 Developed vs developing ratings 
Compared to developed economies, developing economies ratings should be analysed 
differently both with respect to their quality and focus. There are a large number of 
economic factors that have different effects on sovereign credit ratings. For quantifiable 
factors, both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s rely on a large number of criteria in order 
to measure ratings such as external debt which measures the amount that of debt that a 
firm or country holds in foreign currency (Cantor & Packer, 1996). From the tests that they 
conducted to find out whether there is a relationship exists between ratings and their 
determinants, they found out that higher ratings tend to be as a result of higher per capita 
income.  
Kraeussl (2005), conducted a study on 28 emerging markets and found out that sovereign 
ratings have a harmful effect on their financial stability as a result of a downgrade. This 
therefore shows that rating agencies do tend to affect the markets differently, but as 
outlined in the problem statement, the objective is to find out to what extent and whether 
different rating agencies affect the markets differently and to what extent. Another set of 
tests that were conducted by Elkhoury (2009), found out that the expansion of credit rating 
agencies into new and developing markets would lead to economies tightening their 
macro-economic policies and conflicts of interest will lead to weaker financial systems. 
These credit ratings should aid in the intermediation process in order to avoid weakening 
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financial systems and accurate ratings should be used in order to correctly input prices 
(Smith & Fryer, 2012). 
Smith and Fryer (2012), carried out tests on six emerging market economies to test the 
quality of information used in imputing ratings. The results showed that the emerging 
economies had poor information content, the ratings were not evenly distributed and they 
concluded that rating agencies do not lead to market efficiency. The quality of ratings were 
uneven as a result of a number of local factors in the different economies. It is therefore 
important to the research that I will be conducting to see whether these rating agencies 
tend to follow a certain trend when issuing corporate or sovereign ratings.  
Rating agencies list the relevant factors that influence sovereign credit ratings, but the 
certain weights that are attached to each factor and roles and qualitative information plays 
are not know or included at times. Both Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s investor 
services will be investigated to identify what these underlying factors are and if there are 
indeed differences in the weights which lead to different ratings and different outlooks as 
well (Kraussl, 2003). 
An example is that, according to Kraussl (2003), an upgrade by an agency leads to 
increased confidence which also leads to an increased investor base. There will therefore 
be an increase in the demand for the stable financial instruments such as bonds in that 
particular emerging market. On the other hand, a downgrade below the investment-grade 
tends to lead to investors pulling out from those emerging markets. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
There are 3 major credit rating agencies. These are Fitch, Moody’s Investor Services and 
Standard and Poor’s which we can call the “Big 3” in the ratings game. These three 
agencies dominate the market and together they hold at least 95% of total market share, 
and those concerned with policy such as Nazareth (2003), have argued that rating 
agencies tend to abuse their power so that they can put a large stamp on the market and 
therefore dominate. 
These rating agencies attach ratings to companies and debt instruments.  A debt 
instrument is rated or judged on the basis that the instrument, which includes bonds, will 
be received if there is a non-payment of the instrument (Hill, 2007).  
Table 3 below shows the long-term ratings for both Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
investor services. The ratings are split into investment grade and speculative grade. With 
the investment grade, it means that the government has little chance of defaulting on the 
obligation. Those which are rated below BBB- and Baa3 are known as the speculative 
grade. Rating agencies designate letters to stand for a particular rating. Table 3 below also 
provides a summary of the different rating scales that are used by the top two rating 
agencies which are Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s agency, with a sliding scale from 1 
to 22. 
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          Table 3: Ratings for both S&P and Moody’s  
 
Number Standard and 
Poor’s ratings 
Moody’s ratings Investment Grade 
1 AAA Aaa  
2 AA+ Aa1  
3 AA Aa2  
4 AA- Aa3  
5 A+ A1  
6 A A2  
7 A- A3  
8 BBB+ Baa1  
9 BBB Baa2  
10 BBB- Baa3  
   Speculative Grade 
11 BB+ Ba1  
12 BB Ba2  
13 BB- Ba3  
14 B+ B1  
15 B B2  
16 B- B3  
17 CCC+ Caa1  
18 CCC Caa2  
19 CCC- Caa3  
20 CC Ca  
21 C C  
22 SD   
Source: Standard and poor’s (2014) and Moody’s (2016) 
 
 
The highest and most esteemed rating that a government or company will want to receive 
is that of AAA if we are using S&P and a rating of Aaa if we that organisation is using 
Moody’s. The investment grade is what is encouraged if the entity is a trust company, 
bank, pension funds and many others such as insurance companies, as the chance of 
default is low (Hill, 2007). 
I will examine data from 5 emerging markets from 5 different continents, namely, Brazil in 
South America, Russia from Europe, South Africa from Africa, and China from Asia, which 
are classified as upper-middle economies, and Mexico from North America which is 
classified as a lower-middle-income economy by the World Bank (2014). These 5 
countries mentioned above are designated as emerging markets by Moody’s (2016). 
Because of the availability of data and the fact that I am using sovereign ratings, I will be 
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using annual data which will cover a 20 year period from 1995 to 2015. Data on sovereign 
ratings will be sourced from Moody’s investor services and Standard and Poor’s portal 
database. These sovereign ratings are foreign currency long term ratings. I use foreign 
currency ratings because most countries do not trade in a closed economy, but rather as 
open economies.  
 From table 3 above, it can be seen that the ratings have been arranged in a sliding scale 
from 1 to 22. Where the highest rating is given a 1, and the lowest rating is given a 22. 
This is in line with what Cantor and Packer (1996) did, except in their sliding scale, 22 was 
for the highest rating and 1 was for the lowest rating. They converted the ratings of both 
agencies into numerical figures, so as to analyse the determinants of sovereign ratings. 
My study will use the same method of converting the ratings into numerical values, and 
this was done in table 3 above, since I will be using the Ordinary Least Squares method. 
Quantitative data analysis methods will be used as opposed to qualitative data. In as much 
as some value judgements are used by rating agencies are used, the focus of my study 
will mainly be on the quantitative data.  
The method of analysis of the data will be cross sectional data. The advantage that this 
method has is that an analysis of the data can be made using many variables and over 
different periods of time, since my models will incorporate various macro-economic 
variables. 
Regression analysis will be used of the ratings as well as some of the indicators that were 
identified by Cantor and Packer (1996), which are determinants of credit ratings. Some of 
these determinants that were identified include: 
GDP per capita ($): a higher GDP per capita indicates the willingness of a sovereign to 
pay its debts as they fall due. 
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Inflation (CPI index): this can be said to correlate with the credit rating. A higher rate of 
inflation may indicate structural problems and may indicate difficulties in paying the debt. 
Fiscal balance: a balance deficit may show that the sovereign is a net borrower, and if it 
continues to do, this will impact on the rating negatively. 
Real GDP growth: a higher level of economic growth may indicate that a country is able 
to finance its debt and make payments as they fall due. 
 Because rating agencies provide sovereign ratings for countries, it is important to see 
whether there any differences in the ratings as this may create confusion and conflicting 
interpretations for the sovereign that is being rated. For example, a country might be given 
an AAA by S&P and that same country may be rated Aa2 by Moody’s. The lower the rating 
assigned by an agency, the higher the chances of a default by a country. As a first step, I 
will determine whether there are any significant variations between the rating agencies and 
the various economic indicators, and this will be done by plotting a correlation matrix. I 
expect that there will be differences in the ratings, which is why I will then proceed to 
answer the research questions with the models below.  
The regression analysis will be done for all the emerging economies involved and the aim 
is find out whether there is a significant difference in the rating agencies and whether 
these ratings affect the economies differently. 
For the hypothesis tests being carried out, the research aims to find out whether there is a 
significant difference in the ratings used by the agencies and what causes these 
differences.  
The second part of the study will therefore take the economic indicators and see which 
ones are significant in these emerging economies. I obtained the data on the macro-
economic variables from the World Bank and trade economics. These variables are 
collected on an annual basis and also cover the period from 1994 to 2015. These variables 
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include GDP per capita, CPI inflation, external balances as % of GDP, the GDP growth 
rate, the exchange rate and external debt % of GDP. The data on inflation is collected from 
the worldwide inflation database. 
 I will make use of multiple regression analysis for the first model. The aim of this model is 
to see the significance of the economic variables of the emerging markets by the two 
agencies. The regressions will be run on each individual country separately, so as to 
identify the key macro-economic variables used by the two rating agencies. The model (1) 
below shows the estimation of the model: 
𝑌𝑖, 𝑡=𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽6𝑋6 + 𝑢𝑡       (1) 
Where: 
𝑌= dependent variable: Emerging country’s individual rating. Both S&P and Moody’s 
ratings 
 𝑋1= External Balance (%) 
𝑋2= Inflation rate 
𝑋3= external debt as % of GDP  
𝑋4= GDP per capita 
𝑋5= GDP growth 
𝑋6= exchange rate 
𝑢𝑡= the random error term 
𝑡= is the year to be observed 
𝑖= the country being analysed 
The model (1) above will serve as the baseline model, and in the regression analysis, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) will be used. Running the regression for the two different 
agencies for the same country should help explain why these agencies may reach different 
conclusions for the same country being analysed. 
The second model aims to incorporate interest rate spreads and the objective here is to 
identify whether these spreads are positively or negatively affected by the credit rating 
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differentials, if any do exist in that particular year. The spreads data is obtained from the 
World Bank, and annual frequency is used from 1995 to 2015. An increase in a credit 
rating should lower the cost of borrowing by institutions in theory. This model aims to study 
the impact of ratings on the spread in emerging economies. I will use the interest rate 
spreads charged by the banks in these emerging economies as a proxy for the credit 
spreads of the different sovereigns. The rating differential is calculated as the credit ratings 
of Moody’s subtracted from the credit ratings of Standard and Poor’s.  
The estimation of the model (2) is estimated as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑢𝑡          (2) 
Where: 
𝑦= the interest rate spread 
∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔= rating differential (S&P rating – Moody’s rating) 
𝑢𝑡= the random error term 
𝑡= year to be observed 
𝑖= country being analysed 
With these two models, it is important that we know how well the regressions fit the data, 
or rather how well the data is explained. The statistic that does this the best is the R2 test. 
In essence it helps in answering how well the explanatory variables explain the dependent 
variable. R2 lies between 0 and 1. The closer it is to 1, the better the regression model fits 
the data (Brooks, 2014). 
Another test that will need to be conducted once the models have been estimated is that of 
any presence of autocorrelation or serial correlation. This is when the errors are correlated 
with each other. A formal test to use to see whether there is any auto correlation is the 
Durbin-Watson test, or DW test for short. This test only tests for the correlation between an 
error and its most recent value, which is termed first order autocorrelation (Brooks, 2014). 
The test has a null and alternative hypothesis, whereby Ho: 𝑝 = 0 and H1: 𝑝 ≠ 0. 
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When there is no autocorrelation present we do not reject the null hypothesis and 
therefore DW would approximately be equal to 2. Autocorrelation must not be ignored as it 
may lead to wrong inferences being made about the model (Brooks, 2014).  
I will estimate the above models and see if they help in answering the questions identified 
in the problem statement. I will start off with a correlation matrix between the rating 
agencies and the macro-economic indicators which will aim to find out whether there are 
any significant differences between the two rating agencies. Once I have completed that, I 
will then identify the most significant economic variables that affect emerging economies 
using the baseline model, and end off with the third model which will see whether the 
ratings positively or negatively affect interest rate spreads. 
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Chapter 4: Estimation Results 
 
In this section, the results and findings which were outlined by the research questions will 
be answered. The estimation results will be presented in this section. 
According to Chris Brooks (2014), the estimators in a regression have to be BLUE, which 
stands for Best Linear Unbiased Estimators. I will conduct a number of tests on both the 
variables and the model itself.  
The inflation and GDP per capita data had to be transformed into natural logarithms. The 
reason for this is that, because of their large numbers in value, a conversion to natural logs 
was necessary. 
The first thing that I will do, is to provide a set of descriptive statistics of the data, for each 
of the 5 countries being analysed. Descriptive statistics are calculated from the data that is 
available which will be used in the running of the regressions. After providing a set of 
descriptive statistics, I will proceed on to doing a correlation matrix for each country, to 
identify the correlations between the ratings and the macro-economic variables. I will then 
proceed on to running the regressions using models 1 and 2 provided in the third chapter.  
The tables below show a number of measures of dispersion and central tendency to 
illustrate the distributions of each macro-economic variable and full versions in appendix A. 
4.1: Descriptive statistics of macro-economic variables  
 
Table 4: Brazil descriptive statistics 
Summary 
statistic 
External 
Balance 
Inflation 
Rate 
External 
Debt % 
GDP per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean -1.998126 2.098676 25.61759 8.682029 2.850663 1.970652 
Median -2.838794 1.822303 21.41500 8.556843 3.127606 1.950063 
Maximum 1.753670 6.820518 43.74000 9.475709 7.528797 3.327990 
Minimum -4.310274 0.500775 15.29000 7.939414 -3.847362 0.665000 
Std. Dev 2.001825 1.171655 9.531494 0.514261 2.560846 0.719086 
Skewness 0.672789 3.050199 0.675084 0.179970 -0.548673 0.029644 
Kurtosis 2.074186 13.39349 2.027360 1.642962 3.439340 2.371644 
J-B 2.445402 133.16362 2.538237 1.806849 1.280756 0.365151 
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Table 5: Mexico Descriptive statistics 
Summary 
statistic 
External 
Balance 
Inflation 
Rate 
External 
Debt % 
GDP per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean -1.803880 1.844015 23.78659 8.879424 3.016820 10.54762 
Median -1.512029 1.481605 19.78500 8.906951 3.812915 10.89857 
Maximum -0.458544 3.950667 54.18000 9.245075 9.784892 15.84827 
Minimum -5.625082 0.756122 11.13000 8.199968 -12.67379 3.375000 
Std. Dev 1.174117 0.789824 10.85623 0.299715 4.431497 2.725212 
Skewness -1.551909 1.212882 1.297608 -0.709956 -2.105411 -0.600838 
Kurtosis 6.046998 3.697816 4.216627 2.569894 8.507602 3.705296 
J-B 17.34140 5.840336 7.530712 2.017714 44.05931 1.779680 
 
Table 6: Russia Descriptive statistics 
Summary 
statistic 
External 
Balance 
Inflation 
Rate 
External 
Debt % 
GDP per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean 5.899949 2.813361 41.42323 8.510381 2.160486 25.43297 
Median 4.982809 2.479047 38.10000 8.449601 4.383951 28.54909 
Maximum 17.47435 5.369568 90.90000 9.651948 10.00000 60.93765 
Minimum -0.206270 1.809927 27.10000 7.193499 -12.57000 2.191000 
Std. Dev 4.401387 0.954268 14.53543 0.818680 5.956847 13.28729 
Skewness 0.775828 1.488491 2.025308 0.031751 -0.874055 0.140529 
Kurtosis 3.235935 4.298003 7.283590 1.494695 2.889983 3.979730 
J-B 2.258029 9.668229 31.86026 2.080812 2.8123326 0.952293 
 
 Table 7: South Africa Descriptive statistics 
Summary 
statistic 
External 
Balance 
Inflation 
Rate 
External 
Debt % 
GDP per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean -2.483796 1.670539 22.41273 8.456889 2.992754 7.309385 
Median -1.920818 1.770312 18.95000 8.550588 3.069867 7.153249 
Maximum 0.874059 2.603430 40.70000 8.996896 5.585046 12.75893 
Minimum -5.886516 0.488580 11.80000 7.840302 -1.538089 3.550000 
Std. Dev 2.138959 0.560591 8.727818 0.354113 1.648373 2.327972 
Skewness -0.237429 -0.649809 1.023404 -0.149798 -0.723053 0.383362 
Kurtosis 1.762335 2.645341 2.855882 1.731387 3.974523 2.917339 
J-B 1.610863 1.663558 3.859344 1.557542 2.787506 0.545140 
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Table 8: China Descriptive statistics 
Summary 
statistic  
External 
Balance 
Inflation 
Rate 
External 
Debt % 
GDP per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Exchange 
Rate 
Mean 3.459273  0.761827  11.78182 7.576571 9.644318 7.559477 
Median 2.620000 0.683938 11.70500 7.394152 9.46800 8.175950 
Maximum 9.943000 3.238678 17.96000 8.990651 14.23100 8.503300 
Minimum 0.220000 -1.203973 8.070000 6.160137 6.914000 6.073800 
Std. Dev 2.665335 1.061343 2.844772 0.917698 1.936185 0.900679 
Skewness 1.278258 0.209584 0.461565 0.208438 0.742760 -0.527564 
Kurtosis 3.653940 3.059365 2.180759 1.645313 2.909209 1.527824 
J-B 6.383130 0.164290 1.396381 1.841548 2.030428 3.007214 
 
The tables above are a representation of the summary statistics of the 5 emerging 
economies that I have selected. The figures in the tables show that none of the series are 
not normally distributed. This can be seen from the skewness and kurtosis values for the 
variables. For a series to be normally distributed, it has to have a skewness which is equal 
to 0 and a kurtosis of 3. The only series that come close to being normally distributed is 
the South African exchange rate, which is positively skewed with a value of 0.3833362 and 
a kurtosis of 3, the Chinese inflation rate which is positively skewed with 0.209584 and a 
kurtosis of 3.059365 and the Chinese GDP growth which has a kurtosis of 2.909209 and a 
skewness of 0.742760 Other than this variable for South Africa, none of the other variables 
show strong signs of being normally distributed. 
Russia has the largest variation in external balances, while Mexico recorded the smallest 
variation in its external balance. In terms of inflation, Russia experienced the highest 
inflation, averaging2.8% over the period, while China experienced the lowest average 
inflation of only 0.76% over the same period. However, the lowest variation in inflation as 
measured by the standard deviation was in South Africa with a standard deviation of only 
0.56% and the largest variation was in Brazil with a standard deviation of 1.17%. External 
debt as a percentage of GDP was also largest in Russia, averaging 41.4% with a standard 
deviation of 14.5%. China recorded the lowest external debt to GDP ratio, averaging only 
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11.8% and a standard deviation of 2.8%. The growth rate was largest in China, with an 
average of 9.6% and a standard deviation of 1.9%, while the lowest growth rate was 
experienced in Russia, averaging 2.2% and a standard deviation of 6%. Variations in 
exchange rates were largest in Russia with a standard deviation of 13.2, while Brazil had 
the smallest variation of 0.72. 
4.2: Correlation Matrix of each Country 
In this section of chapter 4, I will provide a correlation matrix of the ratings provided by 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s and the macro-economic variables. A correlation 
between a variable and itself is always 1. The correlation coefficient shows how strongly a 
set of variables are related or rather the association between the variables. The correlation 
coefficient is always between 1 and -1, where 1 shows a perfect positive relationship, 
whereas a coefficient of -1 shows a perfect negative relationship (Brooks, 2014). 
I went a step further, in calculating the differences between the correlations of the rating 
agencies. This was done by subtracting Moody’s correlations from those of Standard and 
Poor’s. The extracts of the tables below provide the correlation matrix tables of the 5 
countries. A full set of correlation matrix tables is found in appendix B. The tables below 
were just dealing with the ratings and the macro-economic variables. I did this first before I 
went to find out which of the variables are statistically significant in regression analysis. 
These correlations just help explain how much the dependent variables are explained by 
the independent ones.  
Table 9: Brazil correlation matrix 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables Difference 
S&P Moody’s 
External Balance 0.210734 0.148376 0.062358 
Inflation Rate 0.422934 0.214693 0.208295 
External Debt % 0.664348 0.705791 -0.041443 
GDP per Capita -0.935707 -0.942524 0.006817 
GDP growth 0.040793 0.035375 0.005418 
Exchange Rate -0.180316 -0.150694 -0.029622 
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Table 9 above shows that, for Brazil there is a moderate positive relationship between the 
external debt as a percentage of GDP and the ratings provided by both agencies. There is 
a strong negative relationship between the GDP per capita and the ratings, and this may 
be significant when these agencies rate a country, with a very minimal difference between 
the correlations of 0.006817.  
Table 10: Mexico correlation matrix 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables Difference 
S&P Moody’s 
External Balance -0.195459 -0.44762 0.252161 
Inflation Rate 0.760653 0.636210 0.124443 
External Debt % 0.697173 0.511886 0.185287 
GDP per Capita -0.884811 -0.776550 -0.108261 
GDP growth 0.027860 0.059340 -0.03148 
Exchange Rate -0.741045 -0.811483 0.070438 
  
Mexico, in table 10 above, has a strong to moderate negative relationship between the 
GDP per capita and the ratings provided by both agencies. What is also different between 
table 9 and table 10 is that, in table 10, the exchange rate has a moderate to strong 
negative relationship, and the inflation rate has a moderate positive relationship with the 
ratings provided. The largest difference is that of 0.252161 on the external balances, with 
Moody’s ratings having a higher correlation between the rating and the external balances 
variable. 
Table 11: Russia correlation matrix 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables Difference 
S&P Moody’s 
External Balance 0.205942 0.233240 -0.027298 
Inflation Rate 0.613190 0.660902 -0.047712 
External Debt % 0.896674 0.838813 0.057861 
GDP per Capita -0.834318 -0.894939 0.0060621 
GDP growth -0.108272 -0.116771 0.008499 
Exchange Rate -0.342595 -0.362966 0.020371 
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Table 11 has similar characteristics to that of Mexico. Once again the external debt and 
the GDP per capita have strong relationships with the credit ratings. The differences are 
also small with GDP per capita having a difference of 0.0060621 and the external debt as 
a percentage of GDP having a difference of 0.057861. The inflation rate for both agencies 
has a moderate positive relationship with the ratings, but the external balance and the 
exchange rate have weak relationships here with the ratings. 
Table 12: South Africa correlation matrix 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables Difference 
S&P Moody’s 
External Balance 0.534746 0.493038 0.041708 
Inflation Rate 0.289514 0.149782 0.139732 
External Debt % -0.031053 -0.102652 0.071599 
GDP per Capita -0.688715 -0.779712 0.6107438 
GDP growth -0.182769 0.047015 -0.229784 
Exchange Rate -0.365011 -0.406907 0.041896 
 
South Africa has a very weak correlation between the external debt and the ratings. GDP 
per capita has a moderately negative relationship, but here the difference between the two 
is quiet large, with a difference of 0.6107438. GDP growth seems to have a weaker 
correlation with Moody’s than it does with Standard and Poor’s. 
Table 13: China correlation matrix 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables Difference 
S&P Moody’s 
External Balance 0.333120 -0.242800 0.57592 
Inflation Rate -0.077203 -0.157845 0.080642 
External Debt % 0.820223 0.846911 -0.026688 
GDP per Capita -0.955332 -0.970228 0.014908 
GDP growth 0.177086 0.177168 -0.000082 
Exchange Rate 0.964759 0.962533 0.002226 
 
Both Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings have very strong correlations with GDP per 
capita and the external debt as a percentage of GDP. The largest difference between the 
ratings and the correlations is found with the external balance, with a difference of 
0.57592. 
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The correlation matrix tables above were used just to get an understanding of what the 
research questions are trying to answer. It has been seen from the correlation tables, that 
some of the variables have large differences amongst them when used by the rating 
agencies. The next step will be an estimation of the regression results, together with the 
coefficients and diagnostic tests on the variables.  
4.3: Regression Analysis of macro-economic variables and ratings 
As identified in the previous chapter, the empirical evidence will be presented based on 
the two models. The first model will aim to identify which are the most significant variables 
that are used by Standard and Poor’s and which variables are most significant when 
looked at by Moody’s, whereas model two will seek to find out whether ratings positively or 
negatively affect interest rate spreads. In the tables that I will provide, the variables with 
statistically significant coefficients will have an asterisk by the t-stat, whereby *, ** and *** 
register significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Full regression results are in 
appendix C. 
Tables 14 to 18 provide the regression results of the first model whereby the ratings are 
the dependent variables and the macro-economic variables are the explanatory variables. 
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Table 14: Brazil regression results 
Independent 
Variables 
Results Dependent Variables 
S&P ratings Moody’s ratings 
Intercept Coefficient 
t-stat 
49.49702 
5.956670 
46.55641 
5.699589 
External Balance Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.045028 
-0.298009 
0.7698 
0.106581 
0.717572 
0.4840 
Inflation rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.176968 
1.247648 
0.2313 
-0.422085 
-3.027180*** 
0.0088 
External Debt % Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.037099 
-0.663788 
0.5169 
0.064641 
1.176550 
0.2577 
GDP per Capita Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-4.132471 
-4.456727*** 
0.0005 
-3.690441 
-4.048780*** 
0.0010 
GDP growth Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.081304 
-1.331173 
0.2030 
-0.046720 
-0.778162 
0.4486 
Exchange rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.432619 
-0.949865 
0.3572 
-1.307305 
-2.919934** 
0.0106 
R-squared  0.940829 0.960172 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
For Brazil, it can be seen that the coefficient of inflation rate is significant at 1% for 
Moody’s but is not statistically significant when we make Standard and Poor’s the 
dependent variable. The coefficient of GDP per capita is statistically significant at 1% for 
both agencies, indicating that a fall in the per capita income, will lead to a possible 
downgrade by both agencies. This is because the measurement of the dependent variable 
was such that an increase in the rating numbers was equivalent to its downgrading, that is, 
the best grade was 1. The exchange rate is also important in this case to Moody’s, and its 
coefficient is statistically significant at 5%, which suggests that a depreciating currency will 
lead to a change in the outlook or a possible upgrading by Moody’s. The R-squared for 
both models is above 90%, which suggests a significant amount of explanatory power of 
the macro-economic variables. R-squared shows us how well the explanatory variables 
explain the dependent variable. 
42 
 
 Table 15: Mexico regression results 
Independent 
variables 
Results Dependent Variables 
S%P ratings Moody’s ratings 
Intercept Coefficient 
t-stat 
59.15685 
4.232981 
61.12768 
5.160603 
External Balance Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.279627 
-1.533409 
0.1460 
-0.619468 
-4.007912*** 
0.0011 
Inflation rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.333714 
0.586390 
0.5663 
0.658639 
1.365565 
0.1922 
External debt % Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.049583 
-1.253366 
0.2293 
-0.105770 
-3.154471*** 
0.0065 
GDP per Capita Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-5.657295 
-3.526144*** 
0.0031 
-5.909177 
-4.345497*** 
0.0006 
GDP growth Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.008649 
0.239142 
0.8142 
0.003948 
0.128785 
0.8992 
Exchange Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.08019 
0.646448 
0.5278 
0.061700 
0.534647 
0.6007 
R-squared  0.826108 0.878613 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
In Mexico’s case, the coefficient of external balances is statistically significant at 1% for 
Moody’s but not significant when looked at by Standard and Poor’s. Once again, 
coefficient of the GDP per capita is statistically significant for Mexico at 1% for both 
agencies, which shows the importance of the per capita income of a country when it 
comes to a credit rating. The coefficient of external debt % is statistically significant at 1% 
for Moody’s, but not for Standard and Poor’s. 
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Table 16: Russia regression results 
Independent 
Variables 
Results Dependent Variables 
S&P ratings Moody’s ratings 
Intercept Coefficient 
t-stat 
13.81820 
1.856991 
20.90190 
3.817963 
External Balance Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.080898 
-0.703306 
0.4926 
-0.078947 
-0.932882 
0.3657 
Inflation Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.718603 
1.332983 
0.2024 
0.683905 
1.724322 
0.1052 
External debt % Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.164176 
5.682016*** 
0.0000 
0.073332 
3.449622*** 
0.0036 
GDP per Capita Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-1.276494 
-1.759492* 
0.0989 
-1.839481 
-3.446286*** 
0.0036 
GDP growth Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.021584 
-0.253868 
0.8030 
0.011302 
0.180687 
0.8590 
Exchange Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.020427 
0.611766 
0.5499 
0.035948 
1.453354 
0.1640 
R-squared  0.918330 0.918207 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
For Russia, coefficient of the external debt % is statistically significant for both agencies at 
the 1% level. What this means is that an increase in the level of external debt, will lead to a 
possible downgrade or a change in the outlook of a country from positive to stable, or from 
stable to negative. It is therefore important for a country such as Russia to keep their 
external debts at sustainable levels, so as to avoid a downgrade. Once again the 
coefficient of GDP per capita appears as statistically significant here, but at 10% for 
Standard and Poor’s, and at 1% for Moody’s. 
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Table 17: South Africa regression results 
Independent 
Variables 
Results Dependent Variables 
S&P ratings Moody’s ratings 
Intercept Coefficient 
t-stat 
17.49233 
2.575028 
27.79056 
5.100085 
External Balance Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.450750 
2.588402** 
0.0206 
0.083069 
0.595675 
0.5609 
Inflation rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.097029 
0.359852 
0.7240 
-0.175565 
-0.811715 
0.4296 
External debt % Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.158396 
4.128691*** 
0.0009 
0.094292 
3.064006*** 
0.0079 
GDP per capita Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.882063 
-1.109963 
0.2845 
-2.209273 
-3.465803*** 
0.0035 
GDP growth Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.006331 
-0.058917 
0.9538 
0.068381 
0.793323 
0.4400 
Exchange Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.424998 
-4.50817*** 
0.0004 
-0.294504 
-3.894349*** 
0.0014 
R-squared  0.820308 0.828000 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
In South Africa, Standard and Poor’s pays more attention to the external balances, 
external debt % and the exchange rate. This is similar to those indicators that Moody’s 
looks at, but the only difference is that, the coefficient of external balance is not statistically 
significant for Moody’s. Exchange rate plays an important role for both agencies, with its 
coefficient being statistically significant at 1% in both models, which should make sense as 
the exchange rate affects how the external debt will be paid. The R-squared in this case is 
at 82% which is still good in terms of explanatory power.  
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Table 18: China regression results 
Independent 
Variables 
Results Dependent Variables 
S&P ratings Moody’s ratings 
Intercept Coefficient 
t-stat 
4.947929 
0.579006 
13.78350 
3.408797 
External Balance Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.108012 
-1.647078 
0.1203 
0.025284 
0.489340 
0.6317 
Inflation Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.048891 
0.280132 
0.7832 
-0.163028 
-2.974129* 
0.0671 
External debt % Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.167523 
-1.637423 
0.1223 
-0.018412 
-0.380338 
0.7090 
GDP per capita Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-1.072971 
-1.760218* 
0.0987 
-1.218883 
-4.225924*** 
0.0007 
GDP growth Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
-0.057245 
-0.480714 
0.6377 
-0.037427 
-0.664214 
0.5166 
Exchange Rate Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
1.695417 
3.475738*** 
0.0034 
0.241853 
1.047860 
0.3113 
R-squared  0.970597 0.981252 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
The coefficient of inflation rate is statistically significant at 10% for Moody’s, but does not a 
play role when looked at by Standard and Poor’s as it is not statistically significant. The 
GDP per capita is also important for the agencies when rating China, and so is the 
exchange rate. The R-squared for both models is very high, at a level of above 95% for 
both models. 
As we have seen from the above table, both agencies seem to weigh the GDP per capita 
very highly, as its coefficient is statistically significant in 9 out of the 10 regressions that we 
ran. This is true because as GDP per capita increases, the credit rating of a country and 
the outlook should also have a favourable change. But it is clear from the tables that 
Moody’s places more importance on the GDP per capita than S&P. 
The coefficient of external debt % is statistically significant in 5 out of the 10 regressions, 
which also shows their importance. Because the ratings are foreign ratings, the level of 
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external debt would be important. The rating agencies need to know that a sovereign is 
able and willing to service their debt. A decrease in the level of external debt would 
increase the credit rating favourably.  
In all our regressions, the coefficient of inflation rate was only statistically significant when 
looked at by Moody’s. None of the S&P ratings considered the rate of inflation as an 
important factor when rating a country. This is because, as the rate of inflation increases, 
this triggers more downward effects on the economy and this is unfavourable when it 
comes to serving a debt. 
What is puzzling with the above results is that the exchange rate is not really considered 
by the agencies. The exchange rate affects the way the external debt is paid. If there is a 
depreciation of the local currency, this will lead to the debt becoming more expensive to 
service, and if the depreciation continues, may lead to the debt exploding. What this then 
does, would make the sovereign unable to make payments as they fall due, which would 
signal to the rating agencies that a possible upgrade and a negative outlook would be on 
the plate. 
The GDP growth of a country is not considered to be a significant factor in credit rating by 
both agencies. This is also another puzzle as the level of growth of a country would lead to 
a better outlook on the economy. But none of the regressions consider the level of GDP 
growth as an important factor when rating a country.  
The regressions clearly show that the rating agencies have similar variables that they look 
at when rating a country, but the GDP per capita and the external debt % are considered 
to be of more value when rating a country. As identified in the literature review, these 
agencies may attach different weights to their ratings. The literature also suggests that 
ratings sometimes may be subjective and this is when factors such as political risk would 
come into play. This could be another cause for some of the differences in the ratings. 
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Regression Analysis of interest rate spreads and rating differentials 
This part of the analysis will focus on the second model identified in the previous chapter. 
We have already identified the factors that the agencies place importance on when rating 
a particular emerging economy. This second model aims to identify whether the 
differences in the ratings or rating differential, positively or negatively affects interest rate 
spreads. The interest rate spread is = lending rate (%) – deposit rate (%). The rating 
differential in our model is (Standard and Poor’s rating – Moody’s rating).  
Once again, the coefficients which are statistically significant will have an asterisk by the t-
stat, whereby *, ** and ***, register significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Full 
regression results are in appendix C. 
Table 19: Interest Rate Spread results 
Independent Variable Results Dependent Variable 
Brazil Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
R-squared 
-0.200412 
-1.907467* 
0.0717 
0.160719 
China Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
R-squared 
-0.017773 
-0.307395 
0.7619 
0.004949 
Mexico Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
R-squared 
0.186852 
1.010876 
0.3248 
0.051038 
Russia Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
R-squared 
0.226989 
1.397658 
0.1783 
0.093228 
South Africa Coefficient 
t-stat 
p-value 
R-squared 
-0.10519 
-1.172429 
0.2555 
0.067466 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
Table 19 shows the results of the impact of ratings on the interest rate spreads. The 
expected sign with these results should be a negative sign. This is because a credit rating 
downgrade will increase the spread, whereas an upgrade will decrease the credit spread. 
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Brazil has the expected sign and is statistically significant at 10%. China and South Africa 
are the other two countries that have the expected negative sign, but their coefficients are 
not statistically significant. In Brazil, it is clear that a change in a rating or a rating 
announcement will have an effect on the capital markets, by either an increasing or 
decreasing interest rate, this is seen by the statistically significant coefficient. In Mexico 
and Russia, the coefficients do not have the expected negative sign and are also not 
statistically significant. Which is a good thing, as they are not statistically significant with 
the wrong sign. 
4.4: Residual and Stability Diagnostics 
After running the regressions above, and identifying the variables with significant 
coefficients, I proceeded to test for autocorrelation. This involves checking the model. The 
ways this can be done is either what is called overfitting, which involves fitting a larger 
model than required to capture the diagnosis of the data. The second way is to conduct 
residual diagnostics, which means checking the residuals for any dependence. I then 
proceeded to test the second model for the presence of any correlation. The full tables are 
provided in appendix D. 
I used the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test whereby the hypothesis states that: 
Hn: There is no autocorrelation     Ha: Presence of autocorrelation 
Table 20: Brazil LM test 
 S&P Moody’s 
F-statistic  0.354055 0.304543 
Obs*R-squared 1.136439 0.984628 
Prob. F(2,13) 0.7084 0.7426 
Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5665 0.6112 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.962919 2.053772 
As can be seen from the table above, the DW stat is 1.96 and 2.05 for the rating agencies. 
This suggests there is no autocorrelation as the Durbin-Watson stat says for there to be no 
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auto correlation the DW figure should be at least 2. The chi-square of 0.5665 and 0.6112 
also show that we do not reject the null hypothesis of no auto correlation. 
Table 21: China LM test 
 S&P Moody’s 
F-statistic  2.259164 0.361125 
Obs*R-squared 5.674240 1.157936 
Prob. F(2,13) 0.1439 0.7037 
Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0586 0.5605 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.511008 2.154354 
 
The chi-square values of 0.0586 and 0.5605 show that we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of no auto correlation, and this is also supported by the DW stats of 2.5 and 2.15 which are 
close to the value 2. 
Table 22: Mexico LM test 
 S&P Moody’s 
F-statistic  2.039565 1.439028 
Obs*R-squared 5.254417 3.987720 
Prob. F(2,13) 0.1697 0.2726 
Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0723 0.1362 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.115838 1.927794 
 
The table above shows that the DW stats of 2.115838 and 1.927794 are close to 2, and 
the chi-square figures of 0.0723 and 0.1362 show that we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of no auto correlation. 
Table 23: Russia LM test 
 S&P Moody’s 
F-statistic  0.191249 0.083039 
Obs*R-squared 0.628803 0.277509 
Prob. F(2,13) 0.8282 0.9208 
Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7302 0.8704 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.955643 1.929907 
 
DW figures of 1.95 and 1.92 are present as well as chi-square figures of 0.7302 and 
0.8704, showing that we do not reject the null hypothesis of no auto correlation. 
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Table 24: South Africa LM test 
 S&P Moody’s 
F-statistic  0.495073 0.666548 
Obs*R-squared 4.365246 6.768394 
Prob. F(5,10) 0.7734 0.6798 
Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.4981 0.3428 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.935509 2.245307 
 
The chi-square figures of 0.4981 and 0.3428 show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no auto correlation and the DW figures also support the fact that there is no auto 
correlation as the figures are close to the DW stat of 2. 
I then went on to conduct stability tests on the models. The test that I used was the 
Ramsey RESET test. This is a test that is used when wanting to find out whether a model 
is linear and if it is specified correctly (Brooks, 2014). 
The Ramsey RESET test has the following hypothesis: 
Hn: The model is correctly specified 
Ha: The model is not specified correctly 
The tables with the results of the Ramsey RESET test are found in appendix D. The 
results show that for all models, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model is 
correctly specified, therefore the models are correctly specified. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
This chapter will present a summary of the findings from the previous chapter, the 
conclusions drawn from the study and any further recommendations. 
The first set of tests that I ran were to provide a summary of the descriptive statistics, and 
from these results we saw that Russia had the largest variations in most of the variables, 
namely the external balances, exchange rate, inflation rate and the external debt as a % of 
GDP, however Russia had the lowest variation when it came to the GDP growth, whereas 
China recorded the largest variation in the growth rate out of the five emerging economies.  
I then went on to test the strength of the relationships between the ratings and the macro-
economic variables. What came out is that the external debt as a % of GDP and the GDP 
per capita had the strongest correlations with the ratings when looked at over the 
countries. What this means is that both rating agencies place these two variables as 
probably the most important when it comes to rating a particular country.  
The GDP growth and the external balances had the lowest correlations with the ratings. A 
possible reason for the low correlation with the GDP growth could be the fact that 
developing countries tend to grow faster than developed economies. This was supported 
by Solow (1956), who stated that the reason for this phenomenon is that small amounts of 
capital added to the country would increase productivity. Another reason for this is that 
developing economies are usually playing “catch up” when it comes to technological 
innovations, therefore the growth rate is faster, since developed countries would have 
already acquired such technologies, so growth would not be that high. This could be a 
reason for the low correlation with the GDP growth, so rating agencies may not place a lot 
of importance on this fundamental. 
The poor correlations between the external balances and the credit ratings is due to the 
fact that as a country seeks to improve its overall rating, that particular country will adopt a  
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more cautious fiscal policy and writers have suggested that these deficits may not be the 
best indicators for the fiscal position (Claessens & Embrechts, 2002). Due to these two 
reasons, credit agencies may not place a lot of importance on these two factors, which is 
supported with the low correlations in the previous chapter. Therefore there seems to be 
no clear relationship between GDP growth, external balances and credit ratings. 
The regression results showed similar findings to that of the previous literature carried 
about by Cantor and Packer in 1996. The difference here is that I chose an emerging 
country from each continent so that I could see how rating agencies rate particular 
emerging economies. As identified in the literature review in chapter two, rating agencies 
have come under scrutiny on their reliability, and being rated by these agencies as an 
emerging economy isn’t any easier. The quality of ratings in emerging markets has come 
under fire as a result of them being perceived as being riskier due to the fact of poor 
corporate governance structures and they generally tend to be more politically unstable 
than developed economies (Bruner et al., 2002). Hameed (2005), states that countries 
tend to be rated better if they are more transparent which signals to the markets the ability 
and willingness of a sovereign to pay its debts as they fall due. 
The regression results from chapter four show that Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s both 
place importance on the external debt as a % of GDP and the GDP per capita as their 
coefficients were statistically significant in the models. The external debt as a % of shows 
the amount of external debt that the country has. A country should aim to have a low 
external debt % as this will signal to investors and other interested parties, the sovereign’s 
ability and willingness to make debt payments as they fall due. The emerging economies 
should seek to have a high GDP per capita, as this helps in the positive changing of a 
credit rating should it be high enough. 
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  The only difference that was found in the results was that Moody’s took inflation into 
account when rating Brazil and China. The coefficients were statistically significant at 10% 
and 1% respectively. The inflation should be important due to the fact that a lower inflation 
should increase the credit rating and an increase in the inflation rate should have the 
undesired effect of reducing the rating and the outlook. The GDP growth coefficient was 
not statistically significant in any of the models, and this was already identified by the low 
correlation between this variable and the credit ratings. The reason for rating agencies not 
considering this variable was identified earlier and stems from the reason that developing 
countries tend to have higher growth rates as a result of having to play a catch up game 
when it comes to technological advancements, therefore the GDP growth would tend to 
give biased results, therefore in our models the coefficients did not come out to be 
statistically significant. 
The exchange rate coefficient also comes out to be statistically significant in some of the 
countries when rated by either Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, since the ratings used in 
this analysis were foreign ratings and no the local based ratings. The importance of the 
exchange rate for a country should be when it is now making international payments, 
especially for the value of the external debt. If the local exchange rate depreciates, the 
ability and willingness to service the debt are affected as the payments will become more 
expensive, therefore an emerging or developing economy’s ability or willingness to service 
the external debt will be negatively affected. A large depreciation of the local currency 
would cause the debt to explode, which negatively affects the willingness to pay, which 
therefore sends a signal to the rating agencies of a possible negative change in the 
outlook or rating. 
Diagnostics and stability tests were also run on the models to check for any serial 
correlation between the errors, and also to check if the models were correctly specified. 
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The impact of rating differentials on the interest rate spreads was also identified. Brazil 
was the only country where the ratings had a statistically significant coefficient at 10%, 
while, China and South Africa had the expected negative sign but the coefficients were not 
statistically significant. The spreads also show the way in which markets can be affected 
by ratings. This is because, as a rating agency downgrades a country, the yields tend to 
increase, and these yields will decrease as the ratings and outlooks are of a positive 
nature. An increase in the spreads as a result of a downgrade would suggest that it would 
be more expensive for the general population to borrow money from the bank, which 
would affect the way bank clients make their payments, hence a possible default by clients 
on their debts as they fall due. A downgrade or a rating decrease would have the effect of 
increasing the interest spread, which in turn would decrease the price of bonds in that 
country. It would make it difficult for these emerging economies to raise funds through the 
sale of these assets, as the cost of borrowing would have increased. The overall effect of 
such an action would be that there will be capital flight by local and foreign investors. 
We have seen that the most important factors that are considered by rating agencies are 
the external balance as a % of GDP, GDP per capita and in most cases, the exchange 
rate. The inflation rate is also an important factor under Moody’s. For these emerging 
economies to become more competitive in the markets, they should aim for a lower 
external debt as a % of GDP, a high GDP per capita and a favourable exchange rate. 
Countries should also take consideration of the inflation rate.  
The issue with these credit rating agencies is that they send conflicting signals when there 
are differences in the ratings. Normally a country will pay more attention that gives it a 
favourable rating both in the good times and in the bad times. Conflicting signals will affect 
the country in terms of which fundamentals to focus on, and will also confuse potential and 
current investors. That is why when analysing the effect of ratings on interest rate spreads, 
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I took the differential between the two agencies. An increase in the credit ratings therefore 
improves the cost and terms of borrowing for that country. The opposite is also true for a 
rating decrease. Therefore the importance of credit ratings on emerging economies is an 
important one, as identified earlier, that investors consider investing in emerging 
economies a riskier option, and therefore ratings are important for them. Access to finance 
is not as easy as in developed economies, hence these countries need to focus on 
improving their ratings by focusing on their fundamentals which will end up having a 
positive impact on their ratings. 
Some further recommendations for this study would be possibly increase the time period, 
rather than analysing 21 years. Another study would be to look at if there is a single 
dominant rating agency, by considering if there is a leader-follow relationship amongst 
agencies. This would be to test if rating agencies are really objective, or some base their 
ratings on a single dominant agency. Another study would be to test if a rating in one 
emerging economy has large spill-over effects in other economies that may have a 
different rating.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Brazil 
Sample: 1994 2015      
       
       
 
BRAZIL EXT 
BAL BRAZIL_CPILG 
BRAZIL_EXT_D
EBT___GDP 
BRAZIL_GDP_
PER_CAPITAL
G 
BRAZIL_GROW
TH 
BRAZIL_XRAT
E 
       
        Mean -1.998126  2.098676  25.61759  8.682029  2.850663  1.970652 
 Median -2.838794  1.822303  21.41500  8.556843  3.127606  1.950063 
 Maximum  1.753670  6.820518  43.74000  9.475709  7.528797  3.327990 
 Minimum -4.310274  0.500775  15.29000  7.939414 -3.847362  0.665000 
 Std. Dev.  2.001825  1.171655  9.531494  0.514261  2.560846  0.719086 
 Skewness  0.672789  3.050199  0.675084  0.179970 -0.548673  0.029644 
 Kurtosis  2.074186  13.39349  2.027360  1.642962  3.439340  2.371644 
       
 Jarque-Bera  2.445402  133.1362  2.538237  1.806849  1.280756  0.365151 
 Probability  0.294434  0.000000  0.281079  0.405180  0.527093  0.833122 
       
 Sum -43.95878  46.17087  563.5870  191.0046  62.71458  43.35435 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  84.15335  28.82828  1907.837  5.553762  137.7165  10.85879 
       
 Observations  22  22  22  22  22  22 
 
China 
Sample: 1994 2015        
         
         
 
CHINA EXT 
BAL CHINA_CPILG 
CHINA_GDP_P
ER_CAPITALG 
CHINA_GDP_G
ROWTH 
CHINA_EXCHA
NGE_RATE 
CHINA_EXTER
NAL_DEBT_TO
_G   
         
          Mean  3.459273  0.761827  7.576571  9.644318  7.559477  11.78182   
 Median  2.620000  0.683938  7.394152  9.468000  8.175950  11.70500   
 Maximum  9.943000  3.238678  8.990651  14.23100  8.503300  17.96000   
 Minimum  0.220000 -1.203973  6.160137  6.914000  6.073800  8.070000   
 Std. Dev.  2.665335  1.061343  0.917698  1.936185  0.900679  2.844772   
 Skewness  1.278258  0.209584  0.208438  0.742760 -0.527564  0.461565   
 Kurtosis  3.653940  3.059365  1.645313  2.909209  1.527824  2.180759   
         
 Jarque-Bera  6.383130  0.164290  1.841548  2.030428  3.007214  1.396381   
 Probability  0.041107  0.921138  0.398211  0.362325  0.222327  0.497485   
         
 Sum  76.10400  16.76020  166.6846  212.1750  166.3085  259.2000   
 Sum Sq. Dev.  149.1842  23.65543  17.68555  78.72503  17.03567  169.9473   
         
 Observations  22  22  22  22  22  22   
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Mexico 
Sample: 1994 2015       
        
        
 
MEXICO EXT 
BAL 
MEXICO_CPIL
G 
MEXICO_EXT_
DEBT___GDP 
MEXICO_GDP_
PER_CAPITAL
G 
MEXICO_GRO
WTH 
MEXICO_XRAT
E  
        
         Mean -1.803880  1.844015  23.78659  8.879424  3.016820  10.54762  
 Median -1.512029  1.481605  19.78500  8.906951  3.812915  10.89857  
 Maximum -0.458544  3.950667  54.18000  9.245075  9.784892  15.84827  
 Minimum -5.625082  0.756122  11.13000  8.199968 -12.67379  3.375000  
 Std. Dev.  1.174117  0.789824  10.85623  0.299715  4.431497  2.725212  
 Skewness -1.551909  1.212882  1.297608 -0.709956 -2.105411 -0.600838  
 Kurtosis  6.046998  3.697816  4.216627  2.569894  8.507602  3.705296  
        
 Jarque-Bera  17.34140  5.840336  7.530712  2.017714  44.05931  1.779680  
 Probability  0.000172  0.053925  0.023159  0.364635  0.000000  0.410721  
        
 Sum -39.68537  40.56833  523.3050  195.3473  66.37003  232.0476  
 Sum Sq. Dev.  28.94954  13.10025  2475.011  1.886406  412.4015  155.9624  
        
 Observations  22  22  22  22  22  22  
 
 
Russia 
Sample: 1994 2015       
        
        
 
RUSSIA EXT 
BAL RUSSIA_CPILG 
RUSSIA_EXT_
DEBT___GDP 
RUSSIA_GDP_
PER_CAPITAL
G 
RUSSIA_GRO
WTH 
RUSSIA_XRAT
E  
        
         Mean  5.899949  2.813361  41.42323  8.510381  2.160486  25.43297  
 Median  4.982809  2.479047  38.10000  8.449601  4.383951  28.54909  
 Maximum  17.47435  5.369568  90.90000  9.651948  10.00000  60.93765  
 Minimum -0.206270  1.809927  27.10000  7.193499 -12.57000  2.191000  
 Std. Dev.  4.401387  0.954268  14.53543  0.818680  5.956847  13.28729  
 Skewness  0.775828  1.488491  2.025308  0.031751 -0.874055  0.140529  
 Kurtosis  3.235935  4.298003  7.283590  1.494695  2.889983  3.979730  
        
 Jarque-Bera  2.258029  9.668299  31.86026  2.080812  2.812326  0.952293  
 Probability  0.323352  0.007953  0.000000  0.353311  0.245082  0.621172  
        
 Sum  129.7989  61.89395  911.3110  187.2284  47.53069  559.5253  
 Sum Sq. Dev.  406.8164  19.12319  4436.852  14.07498  745.1646  3707.593  
        
 Observations  22  22  22  22  22  22  
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South Africa 
Sample: 1994 2015       
        
        
 
SOUTH 
AFRICA EXT 
BAL 
SOUTH_AFRIC
A_CPILG 
SOUTH_AFRIC
A_EXT_DEBT_
__ 
SOUTH_AFRIC
APERCAPLG 
SOUTH_AFRIC
A_XRATE 
SOUTH_AFRIC
A_GROWTH  
        
         Mean -2.483796  1.670539  22.41273  8.456889  7.309385  2.992754  
 Median -1.920818  1.770312  18.95000  8.550588  7.153249  3.069867  
 Maximum  0.874059  2.603430  40.70000  8.996896  12.75893  5.585046  
 Minimum -5.886516  0.488580  11.80000  7.840302  3.550000 -1.538089  
 Std. Dev.  2.138959  0.560591  8.727818  0.354113  2.327972  1.648373  
 Skewness -0.237429 -0.649809  1.023404 -0.149798  0.383362 -0.723053  
 Kurtosis  1.762335  2.645341  2.855882  1.731387  2.917339  3.974523  
        
 Jarque-Bera  1.610863  1.663558  3.859344  1.557542  0.545140  2.787506  
 Probability  0.446895  0.435274  0.145196  0.458970  0.761420  0.248142  
        
 Sum -54.64350  36.75187  493.0800  186.0516  160.8065  65.84059  
 Sum Sq. Dev.  96.07807  6.599518  1599.671  2.633323  113.8085  57.05981  
        
 Observations  22  22  22  22  22  22  
 
 
Appendix B: Correlation Matrix 
 
Brazil Moody’s matrix  
 BRA MOODY'S BRA CA BRA CPI 
BRA EXT DEBT 
% 
BRA PER 
CAPITA BRA GROWTH BRA XRATE 
        
        BRA MOODY'S  1.000000  0.148376  0.214693  0.705791 -0.942524  0.035375 -0.150694 
BRA CA  0.148376  1.000000  0.161728 -0.048604 -0.292267  0.367746  0.277395 
BRA CPI  0.214693  0.161728  1.000000  0.201001 -0.313449  0.182782 -0.291943 
BRA EXT 
DEBT %  0.705791 -0.048604  0.201001  1.000000 -0.795479 -0.286963  0.393195 
BRA PER 
CAPITA -0.942524 -0.292267 -0.313449 -0.795479  1.000000 -0.035488 -0.049523 
BRA GROWTH  0.035375  0.367746  0.182782 -0.286963 -0.035488  1.000000 -0.346011 
BRA XRATE -0.150694  0.277395 -0.291943  0.393195 -0.049523 -0.346011  1.000000 
 
Brazil S&P matrix 
 BRA S&P BRA CA BRA CPI 
BRA EXT DEBT 
% 
BRA PER 
CAPITA BRA GROWTH BRA XRATE 
        
        BRA S&P  1.000000  0.210734  0.422934  0.664348 -0.935707  0.040793 -0.180316 
BRA CA  0.210734  1.000000  0.161728 -0.048604 -0.292267  0.367746  0.277395 
BRA CPI  0.422934  0.161728  1.000000  0.201001 -0.313449  0.182782 -0.291943 
BRA EXT 
DEBT %  0.664348 -0.048604  0.201001  1.000000 -0.795479 -0.286963  0.393195 
BRA PER 
CAPITA -0.935707 -0.292267 -0.313449 -0.795479  1.000000 -0.035488 -0.049523 
BRA GROWTH  0.040793  0.367746  0.182782 -0.286963 -0.035488  1.000000 -0.346011 
BRA XRATE -0.180316  0.277395 -0.291943  0.393195 -0.049523 -0.346011  1.000000 
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China Moody’s matrix 
 CHI MOODY'S  CHI CA CHI CPI 
CHI EXT DEBT 
% 
CHI PER 
CAPITA CHI GROWTH CHI XRATE 
        
        CHI MOODY'S  1.000000 -0.242800 -0.157845  0.846911 -0.970228  0.177168  0.962533 
CHI CA -0.242800  1.000000 -0.047299 -0.300522  0.271109  0.498066 -0.163612 
CHI CPI -0.157845 -0.047299  1.000000  0.221621 -0.036955  0.590565 -0.063839 
CHI EXT DEBT 
%  0.846911 -0.300522  0.221621  1.000000 -0.919698  0.350996  0.839874 
CHI PER 
CAPITA -0.970228  0.271109 -0.036955 -0.919698  1.000000 -0.295697 -0.961841 
CHI GROWTH  0.177168  0.498066  0.590565  0.350996 -0.295697  1.000000  0.315629 
CHI XRATE  0.962533 -0.163612 -0.063839  0.839874 -0.961841  0.315629  1.000000 
 
 
China S&P matrix 
 CHI S&P CHI CA CHI CPI 
CHI EXT DEBT 
% 
CHI PER 
CAPITA CHI GROWTH CHI XRATE 
        
        CHI S&P  1.000000 -0.333120 -0.077203  0.820223 -0.955332  0.177086  0.964759 
CHI CA -0.333120  1.000000 -0.047299 -0.300522  0.271109  0.498066 -0.163612 
CHI CHPI -0.077203 -0.047299  1.000000  0.221621 -0.036955  0.590565 -0.063839 
CHI EXT DEBT 
%  0.820223 -0.300522  0.221621  1.000000 -0.919698  0.350996  0.839874 
CHI PER 
CAPITA -0.955332  0.271109 -0.036955 -0.919698  1.000000 -0.295697 -0.961841 
CHI GROWTH  0.177086  0.498066  0.590565  0.350996 -0.295697  1.000000  0.315629 
CHI XRATE  0.964759 -0.163612 -0.063839  0.839874 -0.961841  0.315629  1.000000 
 
 
Mexico Moody’s matrix 
 MEX MOODY'S MEX CA MEX CPI 
MEX EXT 
DEBT % 
MEX PER 
CAPITA MEX GROWTH MEX XRATE 
        
        ME MOODY'S  1.000000 -0.447672  0.636210  0.511886 -0.776550  0.059340 -0.811483 
MEX CA -0.447672  1.000000  0.041924 -0.057622  0.047882 -0.101860  0.351654 
MEX CPI  0.636210  0.041924  1.000000  0.864048 -0.886070 -0.014212 -0.707489 
MEX EXT 
DEBT %  0.511886 -0.057622  0.864048  1.000000 -0.853121 -0.042996 -0.540322 
MEX [ER 
CAPITA -0.776550  0.047882 -0.886070 -0.853121  1.000000  0.017061  0.774630 
MEX GROWTH  0.059340 -0.101860 -0.014212 -0.042996  0.017061  1.000000 -0.088942 
MEX XRATE -0.811483  0.351654 -0.707489 -0.540322  0.774630 -0.088942  1.000000 
 
 
Mexico S&P matrix 
 MEX S&P  MEX CA MEX CPI 
MEX EXT 
DEBT % 
MEX PER 
CAPITA MEX GROWTH MEX XRATE 
        
        MEX S&P  1.000000 -0.195459  0.760653  0.697173 -0.884811  0.027860 -0.741045 
MEX CA -0.195459  1.000000  0.041924 -0.057622  0.047882 -0.101860  0.351654 
MEX CPI  0.760653  0.041924  1.000000  0.864048 -0.886070 -0.014212 -0.707489 
MEX EXT 
DEBT %  0.697173 -0.057622  0.864048  1.000000 -0.853121 -0.042996 -0.540322 
MEX PER 
CAPITA -0.884811  0.047882 -0.886070 -0.853121  1.000000  0.017061  0.774630 
MEX GROWTH  0.027860 -0.101860 -0.014212 -0.042996  0.017061  1.000000 -0.088942 
MEX XRATE -0.741045  0.351654 -0.707489 -0.540322  0.774630 -0.088942  1.000000 
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Russia Moody’s matrix 
 RUS MOODY'S RUS CA RUS CPI 
RUS EXT DEBT 
% 
RUS PER 
CAPITA RUS GROWTH RUS XRATE 
        
        RUS MOODY'S  1.000000  0.233240  0.660902  0.838813 -0.894939 -0.116771 -0.362966 
RUS CA  0.233240  1.000000 -0.163973  0.366717 -0.309448  0.682210  0.343476 
RUS CPI  0.660902 -0.163973  1.000000  0.363562 -0.647763 -0.557600 -0.627657 
RUS EXT 
DEBT %  0.838813  0.366717  0.363562  1.000000 -0.725019  0.139656 -0.156142 
RUS PER 
CAPITA -0.894939 -0.309448 -0.647763 -0.725019  1.000000  0.055638  0.503394 
RUS GROWTH -0.116771  0.682210 -0.557600  0.139656  0.055638  1.000000  0.339079 
RUS XRATE -0.362966  0.343476 -0.627657 -0.156142  0.503394  0.339079  1.000000 
 
 
Russia S&P matrix 
 RUS S&P  RUS CA RUS CPI 
RUS EXT DEBT 
% 
RUS PER 
CAPITA RUS GROWTH RUS XRATE 
        
        RUS S&P  1.000000  0.205942  0.613190  0.896674 -0.834318 -0.108272 -0.342595 
RUS CA  0.205942  1.000000 -0.163973  0.366717 -0.309448  0.682210  0.343476 
RUS CPI  0.613190 -0.163973  1.000000  0.363562 -0.647763 -0.557600 -0.627657 
RUS EXT 
DEBT %  0.896674  0.366717  0.363562  1.000000 -0.725019  0.139656 -0.156142 
RUS PER 
CAPITA -0.834318 -0.309448 -0.647763 -0.725019  1.000000  0.055638  0.503394 
RUS GROWTH -0.108272  0.682210 -0.557600  0.139656  0.055638  1.000000  0.339079 
RUS XRATE -0.342595  0.343476 -0.627657 -0.156142  0.503394  0.339079  1.000000 
 
 
South Africa Moody’s matrix 
 SA MOODY'S SA CA SA CPI 
SA EXT DEBT 
% 
SA PER 
CAPITA SA GROWTH SA XRATE 
        
        SA MOODY'S  1.000000  0.493038  0.149782 -0.102652 -0.779712  0.047015 -0.406907 
SA CA  0.493038  1.000000  0.021456 -0.651490 -0.791824  0.009101 -0.387501 
SA CPI  0.149782  0.021456  1.000000  0.167742 -0.145694 -0.119551 -0.022934 
SA EXT 
DEBT% -0.102652 -0.651490  0.167742  1.000000  0.345676 -0.396001  0.707497 
SA PER 
CAPITA -0.779712 -0.791824 -0.145694  0.345676  1.000000 -0.052245  0.293293 
SA GROWTH  0.047015  0.009101 -0.119551 -0.396001 -0.052245  1.000000 -0.304902 
SA XRATE -0.406907 -0.387501 -0.022934  0.707497  0.293293 -0.304902  1.000000 
 
 
South Africa S&P matrix 
 SA S&P SA CA SA CPI 
SA EXT DEBT 
% 
SA PER 
CAPITA SA GROWTH SA XRATE 
        
        SA S&P  1.000000  0.534746  0.289514 -0.031053 -0.688715 -0.182769 -0.365011 
SA CA  0.534746  1.000000  0.021456 -0.651490 -0.791824  0.009101 -0.387501 
SA CPI  0.289514  0.021456  1.000000  0.167742 -0.145694 -0.119551 -0.022934 
SA EXT DEBT 
% -0.031053 -0.651490  0.167742  1.000000  0.345676 -0.396001  0.707497 
SA PER 
CAPITA -0.688715 -0.791824 -0.145694  0.345676  1.000000 -0.052245  0.293293 
SA GROWTH -0.182769  0.009101 -0.119551 -0.396001 -0.052245  1.000000 -0.304902 
SA XRATE -0.365011 -0.387501 -0.022934  0.707497  0.293293 -0.304902  1.000000 
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Appendix C: Regression Outputs 
 
Brazil Moody’s  
Dependent Variable: BRA_MOODY_S  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 11:27   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 46.55641 8.168380 5.699589 0.0000 
BRAZIL_CA 0.106581 0.148530 0.717572 0.4840 
BRAZIL_CPILG -0.422085 0.139432 -3.027180 0.0085 
BRAZIL_EXT_DEBT___GDP 0.064641 0.054941 1.176550 0.2577 
BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -3.690441 0.911495 -4.048780 0.0010 
BRAZIL_GROWTH -0.046720 0.060039 -0.778162 0.4486 
BRAZIL_XRATE -1.307305 0.447717 -2.919934 0.0106 
     
     R-squared 0.960172    Mean dependent var 12.36364 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944241    S.D. dependent var 2.381385 
S.E. of regression 0.562325    Akaike info criterion 1.939898 
Sum squared resid 4.743143    Schwarz criterion 2.287048 
Log likelihood -14.33888    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.021676 
F-statistic 60.27004    Durbin-Watson stat 2.111389 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Brazil S&P 
Dependent Variable: BRA_S_P   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:11   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 49.49702 8.309513 5.956670 0.0000 
BRAZIL_CA -0.045028 0.151096 -0.298009 0.7698 
BRAZIL_CPILG 0.176968 0.141841 1.247648 0.2313 
BRAZIL_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.037099 0.055891 -0.663788 0.5169 
BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -4.132471 0.927243 -4.456727 0.0005 
BRAZIL_GROWTH -0.081304 0.061077 -1.331173 0.2030 
BRAZIL_XRATE -0.432619 0.455453 -0.949865 0.3572 
     
     R-squared 0.940829    Mean dependent var 12.04545 
Adjusted R-squared 0.917161    S.D. dependent var 1.987515 
S.E. of regression 0.572041    Akaike info criterion 1.974159 
Sum squared resid 4.908463    Schwarz criterion 2.321309 
Log likelihood -14.71575    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.055937 
F-statistic 39.75077    Durbin-Watson stat 1.865941 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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China Moody’s 
Dependent Variable: CHI_MOODY_S  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 16:53   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 13.78350 4.043507 3.408797 0.0039 
CHINA_CA 0.015184 0.031030 0.489340 0.6317 
CHINA_CPILG -0.163028 0.082582 -1.974129 0.0671 
CHINA_EXTERNAL_DEBT_TO_G -0.018412 0.048410 -0.380338 0.7090 
CHINA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -1.218883 0.288430 -4.225924 0.0007 
CHINA_GDP_GROWTH -0.037427 0.056347 -0.664214 0.5166 
CHINA_EXCHANGE_RATE 0.241853 0.230807 1.047860 0.3113 
     
     R-squared 0.981252    Mean dependent var 5.727273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.973753    S.D. dependent var 1.279204 
S.E. of regression 0.207242    Akaike info criterion -0.056483 
Sum squared resid 0.644242    Schwarz criterion 0.290667 
Log likelihood 7.621312    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.025295 
F-statistic 130.8491    Durbin-Watson stat 2.081592 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
China S&P 
Dependent Variable: CHI_S_P   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 16:53   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.947913 8.545535 0.579006 0.5712 
CHINA_CA -0.108012 0.065578 -1.647078 0.1203 
CHINA_CPILG 0.048891 0.174529 0.280132 0.7832 
CHINA_EXTERNAL_DEBT_TO_G -0.167523 0.102309 -1.637423 0.1223 
CHINA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -1.072971 0.609567 -1.760218 0.0987 
CHINA_GDP_GROWTH -0.057245 0.119084 -0.480714 0.6377 
CHINA_EXCHANGE_RATE 1.695417 0.487786 3.475738 0.0034 
     
     R-squared 0.970597    Mean dependent var 6.772727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958836    S.D. dependent var 2.158743 
S.E. of regression 0.437986    Akaike info criterion 1.440110 
Sum squared resid 2.877471    Schwarz criterion 1.787260 
Log likelihood -8.841212    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.521888 
F-statistic 82.52573    Durbin-Watson stat 1.521237 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Mexico Moody’s 
Dependent Variable: MEX_MOODY_S  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:34   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 61.12768 11.84506 5.160603 0.0001 
MEXICO_CA -0.619468 0.154561 -4.007912 0.0011 
MEXICO_CPILG 0.658639 0.482355 1.365465 0.1922 
MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.105770 0.033530 -3.154471 0.0065 
MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITAL
G -5.909177 1.359839 -4.345497 0.0006 
MEXICO_GROWTH 0.003948 0.030654 0.128785 0.8992 
MEXICO_XRATE 0.061700 0.115404 0.534647 0.6007 
     
     R-squared 0.878613    Mean dependent var 9.136364 
Adjusted R-squared 0.830058    S.D. dependent var 1.489502 
S.E. of regression 0.614033    Akaike info criterion 2.115835 
Sum squared resid 5.655545    Schwarz criterion 2.462985 
Log likelihood -16.27418    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.197613 
F-statistic 18.09523    Durbin-Watson stat 1.205943 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     
     
 
  
Mexico S&P 
Dependent Variable: MEX_S_P   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:37   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 59.15685 13.97522 4.232981 0.0007 
MEXICO_CA -0.279627 0.182357 -1.533409 0.1460 
MEXICO_CPILG 0.333714 0.569099 0.586390 0.5663 
MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.049583 0.039560 -1.253366 0.2293 
MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITAL
G -5.657295 1.604386 -3.526144 0.0031 
MEXICO_GROWTH 0.008649 0.036167 0.239142 0.8142 
MEXICO_XRATE 0.088019 0.136158 0.646448 0.5278 
     
     R-squared 0.826108    Mean dependent var 9.818182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.756551    S.D. dependent var 1.468279 
S.E. of regression 0.724457    Akaike info criterion 2.446584 
Sum squared resid 7.872578    Schwarz criterion 2.793734 
Log likelihood -19.91242    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.528362 
F-statistic 11.87672    Durbin-Watson stat 1.090168 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000058    
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Russia Moody’s 
Dependent Variable: RUS_MOODY_S  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:55   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 20.90190 5.474620 3.817963 0.0017 
RUSSIA_CA -0.078947 0.084627 -0.932882 0.3657 
RUSSIA_CPILG 0.683905 0.396622 1.724322 0.1052 
RUSSIA_EXT_DEBT___GDP 0.073332 0.021258 3.449622 0.0036 
RUSSIA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -1.839481 0.533757 -3.446286 0.0036 
RUSSIA_GROWTH 0.011302 0.062550 0.180687 0.8590 
RUSSIA_XRATE 0.035948 0.024565 1.463354 0.1640 
     
     R-squared 0.918207    Mean dependent var 10.68182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885490    S.D. dependent var 2.625631 
S.E. of regression 0.888495    Akaike info criterion 2.854796 
Sum squared resid 11.84136    Schwarz criterion 3.201946 
Log likelihood -24.40276    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.936574 
F-statistic 28.06507    Durbin-Watson stat 1.789756 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Russia S&P 
Dependent Variable: RUS_S_P   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:56   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 13.81820 7.441175 1.856991 0.0831 
RUSSIA_CA -0.080898 0.115026 -0.703306 0.4926 
RUSSIA_CPILG 0.718603 0.539094 1.332983 0.2024 
RUSSIA_EXT_DEBT___GDP 0.164176 0.028894 5.682016 0.0000 
RUSSIA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -1.276494 0.725490 -1.759492 0.0989 
RUSSIA_GROWTH -0.021584 0.085019 -0.253868 0.8030 
RUSSIA_XRATE 0.020427 0.033390 0.611766 0.5499 
     
     R-squared 0.918330    Mean dependent var 11.77273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885662    S.D. dependent var 3.571472 
S.E. of regression 1.207654    Akaike info criterion 3.468608 
Sum squared resid 21.87643    Schwarz criterion 3.815758 
Log likelihood -31.15469    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.550386 
F-statistic 28.11098    Durbin-Watson stat 1.946823 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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South Africa Moody’s 
Dependent Variable: SOUTH_AFRICA_MOODY_S  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:58   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 27.79056 5.449039 5.100085 0.0001 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CA 0.083069 0.139688 0.594675 0.5609 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CPILG -0.175565 0.216288 -0.811715 0.4296 
SOUTH_AFRICA_EXT_DEBT___ 0.094292 0.030774 3.064006 0.0079 
SOUTH_AFRICAPERCAPLG -2.209273 0.637449 -3.465803 0.0035 
SOUTH_AFRICA_GROWTH 0.068381 0.086195 0.793323 0.4400 
SOUTH_AFRICA_XRATE -0.294504 0.075623 -3.894349 0.0014 
     
     R-squared 0.828000    Mean dependent var 8.772727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.759200    S.D. dependent var 1.066004 
S.E. of regression 0.523103    Akaike info criterion 1.795295 
Sum squared resid 4.104551    Schwarz criterion 2.142444 
Log likelihood -12.74824    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.877073 
F-statistic 12.03486    Durbin-Watson stat 1.622603 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000054    
     
     
 
 
South Africa S&P 
Dependent Variable: SOUTH_AFRICA_S_P  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/17   Time: 12:59   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 17.49233 6.793063 2.575028 0.0211 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CA 0.450750 0.174142 2.588402 0.0206 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CPILG 0.097029 0.269637 0.359852 0.7240 
SOUTH_AFRICA_EXT_DEBT___ 0.158396 0.038365 4.128691 0.0009 
SOUTH_AFRICAPERCAPLG -0.882063 0.794678 -1.109963 0.2845 
SOUTH_AFRICA_GROWTH -0.006331 0.107455 -0.058917 0.9538 
SOUTH_AFRICA_XRATE -0.424998 0.094276 -4.508017 0.0004 
     
     R-squared 0.820308    Mean dependent var 9.500000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.748431    S.D. dependent var 1.300183 
S.E. of regression 0.652128    Akaike info criterion 2.236220 
Sum squared resid 6.379066    Schwarz criterion 2.583370 
Log likelihood -17.59842    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.317998 
F-statistic 11.41269    Durbin-Watson stat 1.543767 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000073    
     
     
 
 
  
71 
 
Brazil 
Dependent Variable: BRAZIL_SPREADLG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/16/17   Time: 14:37   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.611244 0.091710 39.37682 0.0000 
BRAZIL_RATING -0.200412 0.105067 -1.907467 0.0717 
     
     R-squared 0.160719    Mean dependent var 3.687592 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116547    S.D. dependent var 0.402299 
S.E. of regression 0.378130    Akaike info criterion 0.983233 
Sum squared resid 2.716658    Schwarz criterion 1.082712 
Log likelihood -8.323949    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.004823 
F-statistic 3.638432    Durbin-Watson stat 0.444337 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.071692    
     
     
 
China 
Dependent Variable: CHINA_SPREADLG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/16/17   Time: 14:37   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.112456 0.080786 13.77033 0.0000 
CHINA_RATING -0.017773 0.057817 -0.307395 0.7619 
     
     R-squared 0.004949    Mean dependent var 1.094683 
Adjusted R-squared -0.047422    S.D. dependent var 0.252645 
S.E. of regression 0.258566    Akaike info criterion 0.223059 
Sum squared resid 1.270269    Schwarz criterion 0.322538 
Log likelihood -0.342123    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.244649 
F-statistic 0.094492    Durbin-Watson stat 0.748388 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.761886    
     
     
 
Mexico 
Dependent Variable: MEXICO_SPREADLG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/16/17   Time: 14:38   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.555732 0.180387 8.624414 0.0000 
MEXICO_RATING 0.186852 0.184842 1.010876 0.3248 
     
     R-squared 0.051038    Mean dependent var 1.698096 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001092    S.D. dependent var 0.516832 
S.E. of regression 0.516550    Akaike info criterion 1.607103 
Sum squared resid 5.069650    Schwarz criterion 1.706581 
Log likelihood -14.87458    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.628692 
F-statistic 1.021870    Durbin-Watson stat 0.560444 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.324777    
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Russia 
Dependent Variable: RUSSIA_SPREADLG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/16/17   Time: 14:38   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.099260 0.285727 7.347097 0.0000 
RUSSIA_RATING 0.226989 0.162407 1.397658 0.1783 
     
     R-squared 0.093228    Mean dependent var 2.347867 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045503    S.D. dependent var 1.048841 
S.E. of regression 1.024701    Akaike info criterion 2.977071 
Sum squared resid 19.95022    Schwarz criterion 3.076549 
Log likelihood -29.25924    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.998660 
F-statistic 1.953447    Durbin-Watson stat 0.314742 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.178323    
     
     
 
South Africa 
Dependent Variable: SOUTH_AFRICA_SPREADLG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/16/17   Time: 14:39   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.490610 0.073234 20.35410 0.0000 
SOUTH_AFRICA_RATING -0.105159 0.089693 -1.172429 0.2555 
     
     R-squared 0.067466    Mean dependent var 1.420505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.018385    S.D. dependent var 0.195565 
S.E. of regression 0.193759    Akaike info criterion -0.354013 
Sum squared resid 0.713306    Schwarz criterion -0.254535 
Log likelihood 5.717141    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.332424 
F-statistic 1.374590    Durbin-Watson stat 0.193282 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.255516    
     
     
 
 
Appendix D: Residual and Stability Diagnostics 
Brazil Moody’s 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.304543    Prob. F(2,13) 0.7426 
Obs*R-squared 0.984628    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6112 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 16:57   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.866221 9.333814 0.092805 0.9275 
BRAZIL_CA 0.008356 0.190644 0.043829 0.9657 
BRAZIL_CPILG -0.038725 0.163497 -0.236853 0.8165 
BRAZIL_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.001727 0.063440 -0.027230 0.9787 
BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -0.060606 1.057990 -0.057284 0.9552 
BRAZIL_GROWTH -0.010022 0.076002 -0.131863 0.8971 
BRAZIL_XRATE -0.089497 0.565786 -0.158181 0.8767 
RESID(-1) -0.175637 0.372962 -0.470925 0.6455 
RESID(-2) -0.203292 0.320497 -0.634302 0.5369 
     
     R-squared 0.044756    Mean dependent var 3.04E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.543087    S.D. dependent var 0.475251 
S.E. of regression 0.590362    Akaike info criterion 2.075928 
Sum squared resid 4.530860    Schwarz criterion 2.522264 
Log likelihood -13.83521    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.181071 
F-statistic 0.076136    Durbin-Watson stat 2.053772 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999461    
     
     
 
Brazil S&P 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.354055    Prob. F(2,13) 0.7084 
Obs*R-squared 1.136439    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5665 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 16:58   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.388334 9.387351 0.254420 0.8032 
BRAZIL_CA -0.017237 0.159432 -0.108115 0.9156 
BRAZIL_CPILG -0.020358 0.150571 -0.135208 0.8945 
BRAZIL_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.010703 0.060741 -0.176207 0.8628 
BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -0.242174 1.031965 -0.234673 0.8181 
BRAZIL_GROWTH -0.006681 0.068687 -0.097268 0.9240 
BRAZIL_XRATE 0.000417 0.476586 0.000875 0.9993 
RESID(-1) -0.016999 0.311622 -0.054551 0.9573 
RESID(-2) -0.280902 0.337747 -0.831695 0.4206 
     
     R-squared 0.051656    Mean dependent var 3.28E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.531940    S.D. dependent var 0.483463 
S.E. of regression 0.598389    Akaike info criterion 2.102939 
Sum squared resid 4.654910    Schwarz criterion 2.549275 
Log likelihood -14.13233    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.208082 
F-statistic 0.088514    Durbin-Watson stat 1.962919 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999073    
     
     
 
 
China Moody’s 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
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     F-statistic 0.361125    Prob. F(2,13) 0.7037 
Obs*R-squared 1.157936    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5605 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 16:59   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.750723 4.319582 0.173795 0.8647 
CHINA_CA 0.005557 0.033155 0.167606 0.8695 
CHINA_CPILG -0.000696 0.087958 -0.007912 0.9938 
CHINA_EXTERNAL_DEBT_TO_G -0.005080 0.051203 -0.099219 0.9225 
CHINA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -0.055638 0.308637 -0.180270 0.8597 
CHINA_GDP_GROWTH -0.003559 0.060632 -0.058692 0.9541 
CHINA_EXCHANGE_RATE -0.033784 0.245228 -0.137767 0.8925 
RESID(-1) -0.062726 0.286050 -0.219285 0.8298 
RESID(-2) -0.238046 0.285958 -0.832453 0.4202 
     
     R-squared 0.052633    Mean dependent var -1.14E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.530361    S.D. dependent var 0.175152 
S.E. of regression 0.216676    Akaike info criterion 0.071266 
Sum squared resid 0.610333    Schwarz criterion 0.517602 
Log likelihood 8.216074    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.176409 
F-statistic 0.090281    Durbin-Watson stat 2.154254 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999005    
     
     
 
China S&P 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 2.259164    Prob. F(2,13) 0.1439 
Obs*R-squared 5.674240    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0586 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:00   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5.322198 8.365809 -0.636184 0.5357 
CHINA_CA -0.040689 0.063768 -0.638087 0.5345 
CHINA_CPILG -0.052970 0.163422 -0.324130 0.7510 
CHINA_EXTERNAL_DEBT_TO_G 0.027823 0.096870 0.287222 0.7785 
CHINA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 0.361500 0.592448 0.610179 0.5523 
CHINA_GDP_GROWTH 0.064307 0.114305 0.562594 0.5833 
CHINA_EXCHANGE_RATE 0.239523 0.478529 0.500540 0.6251 
RESID(-1) 0.400099 0.267943 1.493224 0.1592 
RESID(-2) -0.519259 0.281657 -1.843586 0.0882 
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R-squared 0.257920    Mean dependent var -9.65E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.198745    S.D. dependent var 0.370165 
S.E. of regression 0.405284    Akaike info criterion 1.323630 
Sum squared resid 2.135314    Schwarz criterion 1.769966 
Log likelihood -5.559931    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.428773 
F-statistic 0.564791    Durbin-Watson stat 2.511008 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.788753    
     
     
 
 
Mexico Moody’s 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 1.439028    Prob. F(2,13) 0.2726 
Obs*R-squared 3.987720    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1362 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:01   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.608696 11.70953 0.308184 0.7628 
MEXICO_CA 0.013024 0.150437 0.086573 0.9323 
MEXICO_CPILG -0.092318 0.497028 -0.185741 0.8555 
MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.000185 0.033648 -0.005499 0.9957 
MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITAL
G -0.406161 1.343944 -0.302216 0.7673 
MEXICO_GROWTH 0.009764 0.031666 0.308354 0.7627 
MEXICO_XRATE 0.015163 0.113019 0.134163 0.8953 
RESID(-1) 0.495863 0.294300 1.684892 0.1158 
RESID(-2) -0.255265 0.323888 -0.788129 0.4448 
     
     R-squared 0.181260    Mean dependent var 2.31E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.322580    S.D. dependent var 0.518952 
S.E. of regression 0.596813    Akaike info criterion 2.097664 
Sum squared resid 4.630421    Schwarz criterion 2.544000 
Log likelihood -14.07431    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.202807 
F-statistic 0.359757    Durbin-Watson stat 1.927794 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.924039    
     
     
 
 
Mexico S&P 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 2.039565    Prob. F(2,13) 0.1697 
Obs*R-squared 5.254417    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0723 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:01   
Sample: 1994 2015   
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Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.609253 13.14587 0.122415 0.9044 
MEXICO_CA 0.132981 0.185524 0.716788 0.4862 
MEXICO_CPILG -0.043532 0.533923 -0.081531 0.9363 
MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP 0.002987 0.037106 0.080491 0.9371 
MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITAL
G -0.149729 1.507300 -0.099336 0.9224 
MEXICO_GROWTH 0.016835 0.035694 0.471639 0.6450 
MEXICO_XRATE -0.009521 0.127720 -0.074546 0.9417 
RESID(-1) 0.617682 0.314413 1.964557 0.0712 
RESID(-2) -0.092766 0.294271 -0.315239 0.7576 
     
     R-squared 0.238837    Mean dependent var 1.24E-14 
Adjusted R-squared -0.229571    S.D. dependent var 0.612278 
S.E. of regression 0.678931    Akaike info criterion 2.355494 
Sum squared resid 5.992314    Schwarz criterion 2.801830 
Log likelihood -16.91043    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.460637 
F-statistic 0.509891    Durbin-Watson stat 2.115838 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.828629    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia Moody’s 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.083039    Prob. F(2,13) 0.9208 
Obs*R-squared 0.277509    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8704 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:02   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.206441 5.865406 -0.035196 0.9725 
RUSSIA_CA 0.014439 0.101254 0.142598 0.8888 
RUSSIA_CPILG -0.011767 0.438155 -0.026856 0.9790 
RUSSIA_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.002814 0.025007 -0.112535 0.9121 
RUSSIA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 0.047258 0.590175 0.080075 0.9374 
RUSSIA_GROWTH -0.000401 0.067106 -0.005976 0.9953 
RUSSIA_XRATE -0.004944 0.031912 -0.154925 0.8793 
RESID(-1) 0.143795 0.366822 0.392001 0.7014 
RESID(-2) 0.012043 0.374777 0.032133 0.9749 
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R-squared 0.012614    Mean dependent var -5.50E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.595008    S.D. dependent var 0.750915 
S.E. of regression 0.948358    Akaike info criterion 3.023920 
Sum squared resid 11.69199    Schwarz criterion 3.470256 
Log likelihood -24.26312    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.129063 
F-statistic 0.020760    Durbin-Watson stat 1.929907 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999996    
     
     
 
 
Russia S&P 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.191249    Prob. F(2,13) 0.8282 
Obs*R-squared 0.628803    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7302 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:02   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.146730 7.888317 -0.018601 0.9854 
RUSSIA_CA -0.021900 0.127165 -0.172216 0.8659 
RUSSIA_CPILG 0.149216 0.623093 0.239476 0.8145 
RUSSIA_EXT_DEBT___GDP -0.000681 0.031528 -0.021596 0.9831 
RUSSIA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG -0.042153 0.775952 -0.054324 0.9575 
RUSSIA_GROWTH 0.025970 0.103676 0.250493 0.8061 
RUSSIA_XRATE 0.006801 0.038748 0.175519 0.8634 
RESID(-1) 0.042163 0.334963 0.125873 0.9018 
RESID(-2) -0.204825 0.337028 -0.607739 0.5538 
     
     R-squared 0.028582    Mean dependent var -1.65E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.569214    S.D. dependent var 1.020654 
S.E. of regression 1.278556    Akaike info criterion 3.621428 
Sum squared resid 21.25116    Schwarz criterion 4.067763 
Log likelihood -30.83571    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.726571 
F-statistic 0.047812    Durbin-Watson stat 1.955643 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999904    
     
     
 
 
South Africa Moody’s 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.537881    Prob. F(5,10) 0.7440 
Obs*R-squared 4.662703    Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.4584 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:02   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
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Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -4.151753 12.89975 -0.321848 0.7542 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CA 0.002363 0.159478 0.014818 0.9885 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CPILG -0.024044 0.258605 -0.092975 0.9278 
SOUTH_AFRICA_EXT_DEBT___ -0.003360 0.039334 -0.085431 0.9336 
SOUTH_AFRICAPERCAPLG 0.524685 1.567811 0.334661 0.7448 
SOUTH_AFRICA_GROWTH 0.002756 0.101010 0.027289 0.9788 
SOUTH_AFRICA_XRATE -0.018465 0.102313 -0.180475 0.8604 
RESID(-1) 0.172485 0.434097 0.397343 0.6995 
RESID(-2) -0.017552 0.718493 -0.024428 0.9810 
RESID(-3) 0.269382 0.749773 0.359284 0.7269 
RESID(-4) 0.699569 0.767060 0.912014 0.3832 
RESID(-5) -0.068046 0.652481 -0.104289 0.9190 
     
     R-squared 0.211941    Mean dependent var -1.15E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.654924    S.D. dependent var 0.442103 
S.E. of regression 0.568738    Akaike info criterion 2.011658 
Sum squared resid 3.234628    Schwarz criterion 2.606772 
Log likelihood -10.12823    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.151849 
F-statistic 0.244491    Durbin-Watson stat 1.879175 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.985248    
     
     
 
 
South Africa S&P 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.862552    Prob. F(6,9) 0.5558 
Obs*R-squared 8.032054    Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.2358 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/17   Time: 17:03   
Sample: 1994 2015   
Included observations: 22   
Pre sample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.846285 14.10701 0.201764 0.8446 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CA 0.071280 0.187369 0.380428 0.7125 
SOUTH_AFRICA_CPILG -0.204931 0.312134 -0.656548 0.5279 
SOUTH_AFRICA_EXT_DEBT___ 0.014016 0.056487 0.248134 0.8096 
SOUTH_AFRICAPERCAPLG -0.252226 1.647404 -0.153105 0.8817 
SOUTH_AFRICA_GROWTH 0.029741 0.138239 0.215146 0.8345 
SOUTH_AFRICA_XRATE -0.095547 0.149135 -0.640673 0.5377 
RESID(-1) 0.006387 0.438440 0.014568 0.9887 
RESID(-2) -0.191672 0.542560 -0.353273 0.7320 
RESID(-3) -0.193008 0.690762 -0.279413 0.7862 
RESID(-4) 0.266006 0.668495 0.397918 0.7000 
RESID(-5) -0.320852 0.688342 -0.466122 0.6522 
RESID(-6) -0.870892 0.566585 -1.537089 0.1586 
     
     R-squared 0.365093    Mean dependent var 2.52E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.481449    S.D. dependent var 0.551149 
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S.E. of regression 0.670830    Akaike info criterion 2.327397 
Sum squared resid 4.050112    Schwarz criterion 2.972104 
Log likelihood -12.60137    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.479271 
F-statistic 0.431276    Durbin-Watson stat 2.209468 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.912147    
     
     
 
Ramsey RESET tests 
Brazil Moody’s 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: BRAMOOD   
Specification: BRA_MOODY_S C BRAZIL_CA BRAZIL_CPILG 
        BRAZIL_EXT_DEBT___GDP BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 
        BRAZIL_GROWTH BRAZIL_XRATE  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.416850  14  0.6831  
F-statistic  0.173764 (1, 14)  0.6831  
Likelihood ratio  0.271376  1  0.6024  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.058149  1  0.058149  
Restricted SSR  4.743143  15  0.316210  
Unrestricted SSR  4.684995  14  0.334642  
Unrestricted SSR  4.684995  14  0.334642  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -14.33888  15   
Unrestricted LogL -14.20319  14   
     
     
 
Brazil S&P 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: BRASP   
Specification: BRA_S_P C BRAZIL_CA BRAZIL_CPILG BRAZIL_EXT_DEB 
        T___GDP BRAZIL_GDP_PER_CAPITALG BRAZIL_GROWTH 
        BRAZIL_XRATE   
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  1.435292  14  0.1732  
F-statistic  2.060062 (1, 14)  0.1732  
Likelihood ratio  3.020121  1  0.0822  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.629620  1  0.629620  
Restricted SSR  4.908463  15  0.327231  
Unrestricted SSR  4.278843  14  0.305632  
Unrestricted SSR  4.278843  14  0.305632  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -14.71575  15   
Unrestricted LogL -13.20569  14   
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China Moody’s 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: CHINAMOOD   
Specification: CHI_MOODY_S C CHINA_CA CHINA_CPILG 
        CHINA_EXTERNAL_DEBT_TO_G CHINA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 
        CHINA_GDP_GROWTH CHINA_EXCHANGE_RATE 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.286520  14  0.7787  
F-statistic  0.082094 (1, 14)  0.7787  
Likelihood ratio  0.128628  1  0.7199  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.003756  1  0.003756  
Restricted SSR  0.644242  15  0.042949  
Unrestricted SSR  0.640486  14  0.045749  
Unrestricted SSR  0.640486  14  0.045749  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL  7.621312  15   
Unrestricted LogL  7.685626  14   
     
     
 
Mexico Moody’s 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: MEXMOOD   
Specification: MEX_MOODY_S C MEXICO_CA MEXICO_CPILG 
        MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 
        MEXICO_GROWTH MEXICO_XRATE  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  1.070989  14  0.3023  
F-statistic  1.147017 (1, 14)  0.3023  
Likelihood ratio  1.732418  1  0.1881  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.428269  1  0.428269  
Restricted SSR  5.655545  15  0.377036  
Unrestricted SSR  5.227275  14  0.373377  
Unrestricted SSR  5.227275  14  0.373377  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -16.27418  15   
Unrestricted LogL -15.40797  14   
     
     
 
 
Mexico S&P 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: MEXSP   
Specification: MEX_S_P C MEXICO_CA MEXICO_CPILG 
        MEXICO_EXT_DEBT___GDP MEXICO_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 
        MEXICO_GROWTH MEXICO_XRATE  
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Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.469076  14  0.6462  
F-statistic  0.220032 (1, 14)  0.6462  
Likelihood ratio  0.343076  1  0.5581  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.121815  1  0.121815  
Restricted SSR  7.872578  15  0.524839  
Unrestricted SSR  7.750762  14  0.553626  
Unrestricted SSR  7.750762  14  0.553626  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -19.91242  15   
Unrestricted LogL -19.74088  14   
     
     
 
 
Russia Moody’s 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: RUSSMOOD   
Specification: RUS_MOODY_S C RUSSIA_CA RUSSIA_CPILG 
        RUSSIA_EXT_DEBT___GDP RUSSIA_GDP_PER_CAPITALG 
        RUSSIA_GROWTH RUSSIA_XRATE  
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.275030  14  0.7873  
F-statistic  0.075642 (1, 14)  0.7873  
Likelihood ratio  0.118545  1  0.7306  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.063635  1  0.063635  
Restricted SSR  11.84136  15  0.789424  
Unrestricted SSR  11.77772  14  0.841266  
Unrestricted SSR  11.77772  14  0.841266  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -24.40276  15   
Unrestricted LogL -24.34349  14   
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South Africa Moody’s 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: SOUTHMOOD   
Specification: SOUTH_AFRICA_MOODY_S C SOUTH_AFRICA_CA 
        SOUTH_AFRICA_CPILG SOUTH_AFRICA_EXT_DEBT___ 
        SOUTH_AFRICAPERCAPLG SOUTH_AFRICA_GROWTH 
        SOUTH_AFRICA_XRATE   
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  1.555094  14  0.1422  
F-statistic  2.418317 (1, 14)  0.1422  
Likelihood ratio  3.505486  1  0.0612  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.604575  1  0.604575  
Restricted SSR  4.104551  15  0.273637  
Unrestricted SSR  3.499976  14  0.249998  
Unrestricted SSR  3.499976  14  0.249998  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -12.74824  15   
Unrestricted LogL -10.99550  14   
     
     
 
 
 
